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JUDICIAL CAPRICE 
Eric J.  Miller*
ABSTRACT 
Caprice — the personal preference of the judge — is an available and 
legitimate basis for judicial decision.  On certain occasions, neither law nor 
morality provides a decisive ground for decision and all that is left is the 
judge’s taste or inclination.  Here, she has both the legal power and the legal 
right to decide whichever way she wishes.  
 
Perhaps because it looks like a naked exercise of power, caprice, as a basis 
for judicial decision, is not terribly popular.  Capricious choice is often 
characterized as non-rational because not based upon a particular type of 
reason — what might be called a decisive reason for decision.  Reason-based 
decision, by contrast, is represented as demonstrating that some decisive 
reason overrides competing ones to settle the outcome of a legal dispute, 
independent of the judge’s will.  Absent such a reason, judicial decision 
consists of an arbitrary exercise of the power authoritatively to resolve cases. 
 
My claim is that capricious decision-making, whether rational or not, is an 
inevitable feature of legal decision in a complex legal system, one in which 
there are conflicts among incommensurable reasons for decision.  Where 
legal incommensurability is matched by extra-legal incommensurability, 
there may be no correct thing to do.  The judge is free to pick among the 
available options.  
 
A major trend in recent legal positivism is to claim that incommensurability 
does not entail the sort of judicial discretion characterized by capricious 
choice.  The judge has only “weak” discretion to resolve the case because 
extra-legal reasons bind the judge.   
 
Whatever the merits of the weak discretion thesis generally, I argue that 
incommensurability provides the judge with the sort of strong discretion 
symptomatic of judicial caprice.  In such circumstances, the legal system 
provides, not only the power to decide capriciously, but the right to do so.  
Capricious decision thus confounds those theories of adjudication that seek to 
constrain or minimize judicial discretion. 
 
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I should like to thank 
the following for their contributions and conversations over the genesis of this 
article: Professor John Gardner, University College, Oxford; Professors Duncan 
Kennedy and Scott Brewer, Harvard Law School; and the faculty of Saint Louis Law 
School, particularly Professors Eric R. Claeys and Frederick Bloom.  I have also 
received generous help and encouragement from Professor Spencer Overton, George 
Washington School of Law, and Professor Alfred Brophy, University of Alabama 
School of Law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Can caprice operate as a legitimate basis for judicial decision?1
Sometimes, it appears, the outcome of the case is up to the personal 
preference of the judge: she can decide whichever way she wishes.  
Neither law nor morality2 provides a decisive ground for decision and 
she is presented with a “choice between open alternatives.”3 The 
problem here is not just one of constraint, but of rationality.  Not only 
does reason fail to require a particular outcome, but the judge cannot 
choose between the options on the basis of reasons at all.  All that is 
left is her taste or inclination. 
 
Standard descriptions of capricious choice identify a familiar range of 
psychological sources for the resulting judicial decision.  These include 
the “judicial hunch” or what the judge had for breakfast, as well as 
political ideology, whether conscious or not.4 Whatever the 
psychological basis for the resulting decision, having picked a 
particular option the judge can only try to render her decision 
acceptable post hoc, by operation of the “characteristic judicial 
virtues…: impartiality and neutrality in surveying the alternatives; 
consideration for the interest of all who will be affected; and a concern 
to deploy some acceptable general principle.”5 None of these virtues 
are decisive; rather, they provide the judge with cover for her personal 
preference. 
 
Perhaps because it looks like a naked exercise of power, caprice, as a 
basis for judicial decision, is not terribly popular.  Capricious choice is 
often characterized as non-rational: either as having no basis in reason 
 
1 I use caprice as an equivalent to what Oliver Wendell Holmes called the judge’s 
“instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions,” OLIVER WENDELL HOMES,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  Decisions based on an individual's instinctive 
preference or personal taste do not count as reasons for decision.  Rather, our tastes, 
inclinations, and preferences are “reason-dependent” endorsements of values or 
goods.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 140, 308 (1986); JOSEPH 
RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 50-54 (1999). 
2 Nor ethics, politics or some other determinate, extra-legal scheme of value. 
3 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph 
Raz, eds., 1994). 
4 See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929); JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or 
How Judges Think, 11 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 357, 358-59 (1925). 
5 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 205 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & 
Joseph Raz, eds., 1994). 
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because not based upon reasons or, more accurately, as not based upon 
a particular type of reason — what might be called a decisive or 
“conclusive” reason for decision.6 Absent such a reason, judicial 
decision is often presented as an act of will or fiat, an arbitrary exercise 
of the power authoritatively to resolve cases. 
 
Reason-based decision, by contrast, is often represented as 
demonstrating that some dominant or decisive reason overrides 
competing reasons and operates to settle the outcome of a conflict or 
dispute.7 In the law, a decisive legal reason identifies that outcome 
antecedently required by the pre-existing norms of the legal system.  
The judge’s decision is legally valid only to the extent that it matches 
the legal rules or standards to the facts of the instant case.8 Reason thus 
constrains the judge to defer to that outcome, identified independent of 
her will. 
 
Complex, modern municipal legal systems are, however, gappy: on 
occasion, no single legal reason determines the outcome.  According to 
reason-based theories of decision, even when there is a gap in the law, 
capricious decisions are an inadequate and inappropriate means of 
resolving legal disputes.9 When, for example, none of the legal rules 
or standards provides a decisive reason for decision, the judge should 
nonetheless seek some decisive extra-legal reason in order to break the 
deadlock.10 Capricious decisions — ones that express the will or 
personal preference of the judge rather than some required outcome — 
are outside the judge’s legitimate authority. 
 
Caprice thus marks the point at which reason no longer operates to 
determine the outcome.  The judge must choose between multiple 
options, none of which is stronger than the others.  No further decisive 
 
6 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27-28 (1990). 
7 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 25-27 (1990). 
8 See, e.g., Brian Bix, Book Review: Positively Positivism (Review of Legal 
Positivism in American Jurisprudence by Anthony J. Sebok), 85 VA. L REV. 889, 
898-99 (1999) (citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term — 
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961); Robert Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).  See also 
Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 982 (1978). 
9 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 11-17 (1959) (criticizing judicial “act[s] of willfulness or will”). 
10 Joseph Raz calls this type of reasoning “reasoning according to law.”  For a full 
discussion, see Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1,
8 (1993).  See also JOSEPH See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 339 
(1995) (discussing the role of moral and institutional reasons for decision in legal 
decision-making). 
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reason resolves the outcome.  Although a variety of circumstances 
might account for the absence of decisive reasons, I am particularly 
interested in incommensurable conflicts among legally valid rules.  I 
draw a distinction between decisively regulated cases, where the law 
resolves the conflict among reasons to provide a uniquely required 
outcome, and completely-but-indecisively regulated cases, where there 
are multiple legally acceptable outcomes, but no single outcome is 
required.11 Here the scope of the legal decision may be limited to 
selecting among the available outcomes.  Although the available 
choices are legally valid ones, the law does not mandate any particular 
result, and there is room for the judge’s personal preference to operate. 
 
My claim is that capricious decision-making is an inevitable feature of 
legal decision in a complex legal system, one in which there is a certain 
amount of indeterminacy and, in particular, conflicts among 
incommensurable reasons for decision.  Where legal 
incommensurability is matched by moral or other incommensurability 
there may be no correct thing to do.  The judge is free to pick among 
the available options.  
 
A major trend in legal positivism has been to suggest that legal gaps do 
not entail discretion.  Extra-legal reasons may operate to close the gap, 
and the judge has only “weak” discretion to resolve the case.12 The 
goal of such weak-discretion theories is, I suggest, similar to what 
H.L.A. Hart once called “the Noble Dream”:13 to demonstrate the 
manner in which extra-legal reasons, though prima facie not legally 
obligatory, nonetheless bind the judge.   
 
Whatever the merits of the weak discretion thesis generally, I argue that 
in a discrete set of circumstances the judge possess the sort of strong 
discretion symptomatic of judicial caprice.  I take for granted that rules 
can provide determinate guidance and that there is a core meaning to 
the language of a rule that renders it applicable across a range of 
cases.14 I am concerned with the narrower issue of conflicts among 
 
11 See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. 
STUD. 457-58 (1988); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
12 See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967), 
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); John Gardner, 
Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 457-58 (1988). 
13 H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and 
the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
123, 134 (1993). 
14 See H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994).  Neil MacCormick glosses 
Hart thus: “it is (certainly in Hart’s view) a particular feature of governance that 
under law that state legal orders are characterized by the existence of institutions and 
procedures for formulating in relatively clear, precise and authoritative ways those 
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determinate rules.  Even when rules provide clear direction, multiple 
legally valid rules may conflict in such a manner that none overrides 
the other.  Here, there is no right answer to the question, “Legally, what 
ought I to do?”  At this point, capricious choice is both available and 
permissible.  
 
In Section II, I develop an account of capricious decision in contrast to 
Joseph Raz’s reason-based account.  Raz considers personal preference 
forms too unpredictable and partisan a basis for judicial decision.  He 
suggests that law as a public, institutional system of governance 
according to rules requires the court to operate as an applicative 
institution bound to apply those rules.  In such a system, individuals are 
entitled to expect the rules to be applied in a predictable and neutral 
manner.  The judge should therefore find some objective, decisive 
reason to break the tie.  Accordingly, Raz proposes a hierarchy of 
available tie-breaking reasons: legal, moral, and doctrinal.15 
In the usual situation, where the law provides set of identifiable reasons 
for decision and precludes the operation of competing non-legal 
reasons, the judge ought to rely upon valid legal reasons to decide the 
case.  Where the law runs out, Raz believes morality operates to fill the 
legal gap.  He advocates two theses to explain the turn to morality.  The 
first holds that law and morality address similar issues and so overlap.  
Morality is thus a readily available alternative to legal reasons.  The 
second holds that a judge ought to act morally when the law runs out, 
so that where moral reasons prove decisive she should choose the 
morally best outcome.16 
Morality, however, may prove indecisive.  Moral reasons may be 
conflicting and incommensurable.  Raz then proposes that doctrinal 
reasons, those more general legal reasons organizing a range of rules 
and cases, might provide a decisive reason.  Raz’s theory of 
adjudication is thus a search for public, decisive reasons.  Morality and 
doctrine both provide a neutral, predictable, and transparent basis for 
decision where personal preference cannot. 
 
governing standards of conduct which are ‘legal.’”  NEIL MACCORMICK, H. L. A. 
HART 42 (1981).  Whether or not Hart is correct is not the subject of his paper; if he 
is wrong, we are much closer to the Realist “nightmare” than Hart would care to 
think. 
15 See Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
16 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 14 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995); See JOSEPH RAZ,
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 339 (1995). 
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In Section III, as a first line of criticism, I suggest that doctrine, like 
morality, may prove conflicted and incommensurable.  Accordingly, 
where there is thoroughgoing incommensurability, that is, where legal 
incommensurability is matched by both moral and doctrinal 
incommensurability, there is no decisive reason to dictate the outcome.  
The judge must exercise her personal preference to select one among 
the legally valid alternatives.  Whichever outcome is chosen will have 
been chosen without some (legal or other) reason deciding the outcome.  
Because the resulting decision will be valid as a matter of law, the 
judge thus has a legal power to decide the case as she wants, even on a 
whim.  
 
In Section IV, I argue that caprice is not only an available but also a 
permissible basis for judicial decision, conferring not only a power but 
a right.  In deciding capriciously, the judge is acting not only upon a 
legally generated ability, but also upon a legally implied permission. 
 
The existence of a permission to rely upon capricious choice depends 
upon the manner in which legal and extra-legal norms conflict.  Legal 
permissions may be express or implied: an implied permission to rely 
upon a particular reason exists where there is no reason forbidding so 
relying.  Permissions may thus be generated by the absence of some 
norm to the contrary.  Where the various options conflict and are 
legally, morally, and doctrinally incommensurable, there is no decisive 
reason and no outcome mandated.17 
The available reasons thus fail to constrain choice as between the 
different outcomes.  What results is what I call a pragmatic permission 
to choose among the legally valid outcomes without giving further, 
decisive reasons.  The existence of a pragmatic permission thus 
suggests that judge is both empowered and entitled to rely upon caprice 
as a basis for judicial decision when faced with legal 
incommensurability that is matched by moral and doctrinal 
incommensurability. 
 
The permission to engage in capricious decision makes sense given the 
requirement that the judge render a decision when faced with the 
parties’ conflicting claims.  Judicial decision is not like moral decision: 
in the latter case, the decision-maker may simply decline to 
 
17 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 85-88 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979); John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources 
and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 457-58 (1988). 
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adjudicate.18 Where the judge is obliged to pick one or other outcome, 
and public, decisive reasons give out, the personal preference may be 
all that is left to a decision-maker. 
 
The pragmatic permission to judge based on personal preference 
conflicts with the Legal Process schools emphasis on legal balancing 
and reasoned elaboration from the extant legal principles.  Capricious 
decision-making exists because where incommensurability precludes 
balancing the various options and the process of elaboration fails to 
identify a unique outcome.  Under these circumstances, choice turns on 
personal preference rather than institutional norms.   
 
II. LEGAL GAPS AND JUDICIAL CHOICE 
Much recent positivist theorizing about the scope of judicial discretion 
attempts to demonstrate that judges may have only weak discretion.19 I
am more interested in resuscitating or reinvigorating the thesis that, on 
occasion, judges have strong discretion.  Such discretion exists, for 
example, where indeterminacy in law is matched by indeterminacy in 
morality.  Wherever the judge looks for guidance, none is forthcoming.   
 
In the analytic tradition, H.L.A. Hart was perhaps the most significant 
figure to endorse strong discretion.  He suggested that, on occasion, 
judges are faced with a “choice between open alternatives.”20 While 
 
18 Perhaps the most notable argument against the requirement that judges decide the 
cases before them is advance by Alexander Bickel, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), and more recently taken up by Cass Sunstein, 
see CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999).  Both advocate a policy of judicial minimalism, whereby the United 
States Supreme Court, in particular, avoid deciding controversial cases or issues 
using a variety of procedural techniques. 
19 See, e.g., John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. 
STUD. 457-58 (1988); JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN  (1995); Neil 
MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response To CLS, 10
OXFORD. J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 544 (1990); John Finnis, On The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, in: OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 145, 
160-61 (John Eekelaar and John Bell, eds., 1987). MacCormick and Finnis develop 
these claims in response to the CLS indeterminacy thesis; Gardner and Raz have 
other fish to fry. 
20 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph 
Raz, eds., 1994).  A different situation is where, with our without discretion, the 
judge opts to ignore the law.  One might call this judicial nullification by comparison 
with jury nullification.  Here, the judge’s decision gains its institutional authority, if 
at all, after the fact.  The decision, because not required by the law, has the same 
status as a mistaken decision: it is authoritative for the parties and subordinate legal 
officials because the judge is empowered, if not entitled, to render a decision.  It 
becomes authoritative for judges of equal or higher rank subject to their acquiescence 
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the law may limit the range of available options, it does not require a 
particular decision.  Without rules to guide her, the judge’s choice as 
between the available options is unconstrained.21 
The weak discretion thesis holds that legal indeterminacy need not 
result in unconstrained decision-making. Rather, the judge must choose 
among a limited range of options to elaborate the available legal 
standards where their application in a particular case is not automatic.22 
Ronald Dworkin originally coined weak discretion to demonstrate that 
adjudication consists in the reasoned elaboration of legal principles that 
control, albeit non-“mechanically,” the outcome of a case.23 The judge 
gets all the guidance she requires from legal principles: she need not 
turn outside law to find gap-closing standards. 
 
Dworkin soon reformulated his thesis to include among the relevant 
legal principles those derived from “political morality.”24 More 
recently, Dworkin has emphasized the relative transparency of legal 
 
and ratification.  For a somewhat radical embrace of this position, see Richard A. 
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005) (arguing the 
Supreme Court is not bound by legal norms and acts in a fully political way).  Under 
such circumstances, “all that succeeds is success.”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 153 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz, eds., 1994). 
21 See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare 
and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
123, 124-26 (1993).This description of strong discretion comports with Dworkin, 
who asserts strong discretion exists where, “on some issue [an official] is simply not 
bound by standards set by the authority in question.”  Ronald Dworkin, The Model of 
Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); see also Ronald Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal 
Theory, 81 Yale. L.J. 855, 879 (1972) (reprinted as The Model of Rules II) in 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
22 Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967), reprinted 
in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).  “Sometimes we use 
‘discretion’ in a weak sense, simply to say that for some reason the standards an 
official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgment.”  
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 32 (1967).   Dworkin 
also suggested that weak discretion could refer to a different situation, where “some 
official has final authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed 
by any other official.”  Id. 
23 Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 35-6 (1967), 
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).  See also Brian 
Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2003) (discussing Dworkin’s distinction between 
weak and strong discretion) 
24 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 Yale. L.J. 855, 878-
882 (1972) (reprinted as The Model of Rules II) in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1082 (1975); Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1978); 
both reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
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reasoning to moral theorizing about public reasons.25 The judge is to 
approach each legal problem by attempting to provide the morally best 
and most coherent reconstruction of the rules and values of her legal 
system.  The general requirement that the judge select one side in a 
dispute and the fact that the judge does not reinvent the law but must 
accommodate the outcome within an extant body of legal and political 
materials entails, Dworkin believes, that in each case there can be only 
one “best” justification.26 
Dworkin asserts that, because positivists believe that the law “runs 
out,” they must endorse some version of strong discretion whereby 
judicial decision is unconstrained by legal principles.  According to 
Dworkin, in other words, the positivist “sources thesis” entails that 
when there is a legal gap the judge may base her decision on any 
reason, unconstrained by law.27 One positivist response to Dworkin 
points to the limited range of options generally facing a judge.  Her 
discretion is “weak” in that she is constrained to pick one among the 
legally valid options.28 I am concerned primarily with Joseph Raz’s 
alternative thesis that, additionally, morality, though not part of law, 
nonetheless provides reason-based limits to judicial discretion.   
 
I have no quibble, in certain circumstances, with the positivist embrace 
of weak discretion.  In this section, however, my point is that weak 
discretion is not always the only option open to a judge.  On occasion, 
judges are constrained to exercise weak discretion; but strong discretion 
is an inherent possibility in a system in which legal incommensurability 
is matched by moral and doctrinal incommensurability.  In such 
circumstances, none of the available reasons for decision are decisive, 
and some remain undefeated.  
 
The alternative, which is a full embrace of the weak-discretion thesis, 
represents a variation of the “Noble Dream”: 
 
25 Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1978); reprinted 
in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
26 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
27 Dworkin suggests that positivists claim “that when judges disagree about matters 
of principle they disagree not about what the law requires but about how their 
discretion should be exercised.  They disagree, that is, not about where their duty to 
decide lies, but about how they ought to decide, all things considered, given that they 
have no duty to decide either way.”  Ronald Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal 
Theory, 81 Yale. L.J. 855, 879 (1972) (reprinted as The Model of Rules II) in 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) 
28 See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. 
STUD. 457-59 (1988). 
JUDICIAL CAPRICE 
9
that, in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary . . . still 
an explanation and a justification can be provided for the 
common expectation of litigants that judges should apply to 
their cases existing law and not make new law for them, even 
when the test of particular constitutional provisions, statutes, 
or available precedents appears to offer no determinate 
guide.29 
I will suggest that Raz endorses a positivist variant of the weak-
discretion thesis.  His weak-discretion positivism departs from the 
Noble Dream in rejecting the claim that existing law is sufficient to 
determine all legal problems.  Existing law, Raz claims, may be 
indecisive or gappy; nonetheless, morality often provides a determinate 
outcome where law does not (and if morality does not, doctrine will).  
The Noble Dreamers thus agree that some decisive reason is required to 
justify judicial decision; they disagree is over whether that gap-closing 
morality is part of the law or not.30 
A. Courts as Applicative Institutions 
 
Raz famously believes that, from the “point of view” of the system,31 
legal rules are exclusionary reasons for action that provide an 
authoritative and binding reason for individuals to regulate their 
behavior.32 Exclusionary reasons are both first-order reasons for action 
and second-order reasons that preclude decision-makers from relying 
on conflicting non-legal reasons in determining what to do.  Law is thus 
an “exclusionary system” that “exclude[s the] application of rules, 
standards and norms which do not belong to the system or are not 
recognized by it.”33 Therefore only legal reasons should be considered 
in deciding what one ought to do if one is to be guided by the law.  
What I now want to consider is the role of the courts in enforcing legal 
norms. 
 
29 See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare 
and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
123, 132 (1993). 
30 See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 99-101 (1993). 
31 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 139. 
32 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 65-9 (1990); see also Joseph 
Raz, Reasons For Action, Decisions and Norms, in PRACTICAL REASONING, (Joseph 
Raz ed., 1978); and Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, at 
1154-1179 (1989). 
33 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 145 
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According to Raz, the legal system is not only an exclusionary, but also 
an institutionalized system of norms.34 The characteristic feature an 
institutionalized system is the presence of what Raz terms “primary 
norm-applying organs”:35 officials or “institutions with power to 
determine the normative situation of specified individuals, which are 
required to exercise these powers by applying existing norms, but 
whose decisions are binding, even when wrong.”36 These applicative 
institutions have, according to Raz’s definition, three features.  By 
virtue of their institutional role they are granted a power;37 that power is 
a limited one, confined to the application of the institution’s norms; 38 
and their application is authoritative and final upon the subjects of the 
norms.39 
In a legal system, courts count among the various applicative 
institutions of the system.40 The court’s applicative determinations are 
made on the basis of the existing norms of the system, not, for example, 
at the discretion of the judge.  Thus, although on occasion courts may 
make law, what distinguishes the court as an applicative institution, and 
the law as an institutional system, is the courts’ declarative (rather than 
legislative) role.41 
In contrast to the purely applicative role, a court could have (at least) 
two different types of discretion. First, one in which the adjudication-
 
34 This statement involves at least two different claims; first, that the law is a system 
of norms; and second, that the law is an institutionalized system.   For a collection of 
norms to be held to form a system, the norms must be internally related: its rules, 
standards and principles possess “a certain unity and interdependence”  JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 113 .  For more on law as an institutional system of 
norms, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS ch. 4, Raz, The Concept of 
a Legal System chs. 6 and 7, MacCormick and Weinberger, An Institutional Theory 
of Law ; MacCormick, Law As Institutional Fact (1974) 90 LQR; MacCormick, 
Legal Reasoning and the Institutional Theory of Law, 9 Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 14. 
35 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 136. 
36 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 136. 
37 According to H.L.A. Hart, this power is granted through the existence of “rules of 
adjudication”: those “secondary rules empowering individuals to make authoritative 
determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has 
been broken…[such rules] confer judicial powers and a special status on judicial 
declarations about the breach of obligations.”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
96-97 (2d ed. 1994). 
38 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 132-3. 
39 Raz believes these features are essential to all primary norm-applying organs of 
institutionalised normative systems.  See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND 
NORMS ch. 4. 
40 Raz points out that “tribunals and other judicial bodies…[and even] other officials, 
such as police officers, may also be primary organs.”  JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL 
REASON AND NORMS 136. 
41 JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 137-7 (2d ed., 1990). 
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rendering institutions are not required to decide on basis of specified 
rules, but instead are able to select, at their own discretion, the reasons 
on which they wish to rely in giving a decision.42 Such institutions are 
different from primary organs in that they do not apply the (action-
guiding) norms of a system, but merely adjudicate disputes on the 
balance of reasons, which they are free to select. This envisages the 
adjudicative process as one in which the court always possesses “strong 
discretion,”43 and its primary function is to render judgment between 
parties rather than apply systematized standards of behavior.  
 
Second, an adjudication-rendering institution could have a duty to 
apply the norms of the system, but possess the discretion to ignore 
those rules that failed some generalized merit test.  Here the 
adjudicative institution is concerned with the guiding function of the 
institutional system to a limited extent, but is willing to compromise 
this function when it judges that, all things considered, there is some 
better decision than that which could be reached by applying the norms, 
e.g., one which in the circumstances is more just or efficient. This 
envisages the court as possessing the power and the right to nullify the 
law based on certain extra-legal standards.    
 
Neither sort of discretion is compatible with Raz’s definition of an 
applicative institution. Rather, such institutions are ”'bound to apply…a 
certain body of norms regardless of their views of the merits and are 
allowed to act on their views only to the extent that this is allowed by 
these norms.”44 This is to stress the norm-applying function of the 
courts.45 
Courts acts solely in its applicative or declarative role when the law 
decisively regulates the outcome.46 A case is regulated when the legal 
norms, on their own, determine the range of possible legal decisions; a 
 
42 The sort of system in which such adjudicatory institutions occur Raz calls 
“systems of absolute discretion”; see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS  
pp. 137-140. 
43 Brian Leiter points out that, “The distinction between strong and weak discretion is 
Dworkin's, not Hart's, and it seems to obscure rather than illuminate Hart's actual 
reasons for thinking judges have discretion. Hart need not maintain that in cases of 
discretion, judges are bound by no authoritative standards: there may, indeed, be 
binding standards that narrow the range of possible decisions.” Brian Leiter, Beyond 
the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. 
JURIS. 17, 21 (2003).   
44 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 139. 
45 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 142. 
46 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 182 (1979) (“a regulated dispute is one 
to which the law provides a solution. The judge can be seen here in his classical 
image: he identifies the law, determines the facts, and applies the law to the facts.”). 
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case is decisively regulated where there is one unique outcome to the 
case.47 All the court must do is correctly enforce the outcome 
stipulated by the rules.  In a complex institutional system, however, 
there will be cases in which the rules purport to guide behavior but fail 
to enable a purely applicative determination to be made.  Where the 
legal norms support multiple options, the case is indecisively 
regulated;48 where the norms fail to provide guidance given the 
circumstances, then the case is unregulated so that the court faces a 
case of first impression.  In either circumstance, the manner in which 
an agent is to comply with the rules is legally indeterminate.   
 
When the law is indeterminate, it would not be correct to say that any 
proposed determination is uniquely required by the legal rules.  Instead, 
the judge must turn outside the legal system for guidance or pick 
among the competing outcomes without considering non-legal reasons.  
Here the judge can no longer simple declare which outcome the law 
requires and so must make a legislative choice in selecting an outcome.  
Raz considers that such cases express a legal gap.49 
B. Conflicts Among Incommensurable Reasons 
 
I am particularly interested in the sort of indeterminacy arising from 
conflicts of incommensurable reasons.  Legal rules or standards are 
incommensurable or fragmented if competing options represent 
radically different schemes of valuing.50 Rather than aligning on some 
unitary scale such as importance or authoritativeness, the competing 
values “talk past” each other.  Incommensurability represents a 
challenge to more harmonious accounts of value and provides one 
potential source of strong discretion.  
 
Incommensurability may be contrasted with more traditional accounts 
of rational action as dependant upon identifying one option that, 
because supported by the weightiest reasons, dominates or overrides 
the others. In this situation, if the agent is to be guided by reason in her 
decision, she must compare the relevant reasons and act on whichever 
 
47 Either because some reason overrides or excludes competing options, or because 
competing options are rendered null by some canceling condition.  See John Gardner, 
Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 457-58 (1988); 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 70 (1979). 
48 See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. 
STUD. 457-58 (1988). 
49 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 70 (1979). 
50 Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL 
QUESTIONS 128 (1979). 
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is the strongest one.51 This style of rational justification requires the 
agent to “weigh”52 or “balance”53 or “rank”54 (by “strength” or 
“importance”55) or otherwise commensurate the various competing 
reasons and identify one of them as decisive (or “conclusive”56), that is, 
one that “overrides,”57 or “outweighs”58 the other relevant competing 
reasons.   
 
This traditional account of rational decision is exemplified by the 
“balancing test,” one of the central components of the American 
version of weak discretion.59 Balancing is a means of comparing 
competing interests by weighing them one against the other.  In order 
for the balancing test to work, there most be some value-neutral way to 
reduce the competing interests to a single currency and then compare 
them.60 It thus provides an applicative account legal decision.  When 
 
51 Coleman recognizes the problems with such an assertion.  See Jules L. Coleman, 
The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 15 n.3 (1995) (“To say that 
what I ought to do depends on the reasons that apply to me is not to say that the 
justification of everything I do is settled by reason and reason alone.  There are many 
choices I am justified in making for which I cannot offer conclusory reasons. Still, 
reasons figure prominently in determining what I ought to do.”). 
52 See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 97 (1993); see also 
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 115 (1980).  See also JOHN 
FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, 87-88 (1983); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 946 (1987). 
53 See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 97 (1993). 
54 See John Finnis, Commensuration and Public Reason in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 215, 215 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997); 
Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1169, 1170 (1998). 
55 See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, 110, 110-28 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997). 
56 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27-28. 
57 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 26-27; JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
58 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L. J. 943, 946 (1987). 
59 Balancing tests are a feature of, in particular, American constitutional adjudication, 
and is generally defined as requiring, at the least, a comparison of the constitutional 
rights protected against governmental interests. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 945 (1987); Patrick 
McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 293 (1992); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 
(1992). 
60 Balancing describes “those cases in which the scales serve as the central metaphor, 
and which explicitly: 1) set a balance by describing the elements to be weighed and 
the legal effect of the outcome; 2) discuss those elements; and 3) declare the winner 
based on the results of the balancing procedure.” Patrick M. McFadden, The 
Balancing Test, 29 B. C. L. REV. 585, 596 (1988).  Balancing fits with the neutral 
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legal reasons conflict in commensurable manner the judge should 
identify the conflicting legal reasons, determine their relative strength, 
and prefer the strongest reason as determining the outcome.  The judge 
does not participate in setting the relative weights of the rights or 
interests compared; she rather defers to the prior legislative or 
constitutional assessment and simply declares the outcome. 
 
Balancing works best in an exclusionary system of norms, where the 
relative weight of the competing reasons may be determined 
“artificially,”61 from the point of view of the exclusionary system.  
Where the system’s norms regulate the relative strength of competing 
reasons, the decision-maker may thus refuse to consider the extra-
systemic weights assigned to the competing norms. 
 
There has, however, recently emerged a vigorous debate over whether 
reasons (or the values which underlie them)62 are always 
commensurable inter se. Some clearly are: where commensurable 
reasons conflict, indeterminacy results only if the reasons are equal in 
strength, precluding any from operating as a decisive reason for 
decision.  A different situation, however, is presented when conflicting 
reasons for action may not be measured on a single scale (of strength, 
 
principles aspects of legal process in deferring to legal sources to determine the 
outcome independent of the judge’s will.  See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 524 (1951) (“But how are competing interests to be assessed?  Since they are 
not subject to quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into 
asking, who is to make the adjustment?—who is to balance the relevant factors and 
ascertain which interest is in the circumstances to prevail?  Full responsibility for the 
choice cannot be given to the courts.  Courts are not representative bodies.  They are 
not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.  Their judgment is best 
informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits.  Their essential 
quality is detachment, founded on independence.  History teaches that the 
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the 
passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between 
competing political, economic and social pressures.  ¶Primary responsibility for 
adjusting the interests which compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs 
to the Congress.”) 
61 DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE II.i. (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. 
Nidditch, eds., 1989) (describing justice as an artificial virtue, that is, a human (rather 
than natural) construct). 
62 In the relationship between values and reasons, values provide grounds for reasons.  
See John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in JULES COLEMAN AND SCOTT 
SHAPIRO (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 440 (2002).  A justified reason is one that identifies a value (something of 
value).  Some regard reasons as additional based upon desires (and not value), but as 
Gardner and Macklem suggest, if our desires are subject to reason they too must pick 
out something of value.  Id. 
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importance, etc.) and so balancing is impossible.63 Instead, the relation 
between some reasons is intransitive,64 such that the conflicting reasons 
remain undefeated,65 and to commensurate the reasons would be to 
alter them.66 These reasons are incommensurable and “reason has no 
judgment to make concerning their relative value.”67 
63 It is important to proceed with caution here.  Balancing depends upon a 
combination of comparability, exclusion, and the presence or absence of canceling 
facts.  Accordingly, the fact that reasons are incomparable does not preclude 
balancing.  Competing reasons may be excluded from operating by the norms of the 
system, or canceled from operating by some circumstance particular to the individual 
case.  Furthermore, as we shall see, balancing is only one of the techniques relied 
upon by the American weak discretion noble dreamers; the other is the process of 
“reasoned elaboration.”  See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 143-52 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (originating phrase 
“reasoned elaboration”); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in 
American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 601, 632-39 (1993) (discussing role of 
reasoned elaboration within Legal Process school). 
64 Intransitivity exists where A is a reason for B, and B is a reason for C, but A is not 
a reason for C. For various discussions of intransitivity, see JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 322, 325-326 (1988) (“A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true 
that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value…(1) neither 
[option] is better than the other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option which is 
better than one but is not better than the other.”); BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND 
LEGAL DETERMINACY 96 (1993); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND 
ECONOMICS at 55, 67-8 (1995) (adopting in part Raz’s definition); Richard A. 
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, Or Is Utility the Rule of the World?, 1995 
UTAH L. REV. 683, 686 (1995) (same); and see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth 
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy; Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, 
and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV 2121, 2148-51 2160 (1990); Cass 
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 801-802 
(1994); Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor 
Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 813, (1994). 
65 The undefeated nature of incommensurable reasons, so prominent in John Gardner, 
Justifications and Reasons, in ANDREW SIMESTER AND A.T.H. SMITH (EDS), HARM 
AND CULPABILITY 103-31 (1996); & John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in 
JULES COLEMAN AND SCOTT SHAPIRO (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 470-74 (2002), is also contained in 
Wiggins identification of a “remainder” and Bernard Williams pointing to some type 
“residue” in choice among incommensurables.  See David Wiggins, 
"Incommensurability: Four Proposals," in RUTH CHANG, (ED.) 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, 52, 53 (1997); 
Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166, 172-77, 182-
5.  Choice does not make the un-chosen values disappear; nor are they ranked lower 
than the chosen values; nor do they change their nature.  See Bernard Williams, 
Ethical Consistency, at 172-77. 
66 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 115 (1980).  See also JOHN 
FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, 87-88 (1983); JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM 339 (1986). 
67 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 324 (1986).  And see id. at 334 
(“Incomparability . . . marks the inability of reason to guide our action.”). 
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This definition of incommensurability has three features: first, 
intransitivity entails that changes in the value of one reason will not 
affect its worth relative to another reason with which it is 
incommensurable.  There is no a “single scale of value” upon which to 
measure the competing reasons.68 
Second, the claim that the conflicting reasons remain undefeated entails 
only that there is no decisive reason supporting a particular option, not 
that there are no reasons at all.  Reason has nothing more to say about 
their relative value and cannot buttress the decision-maker’s preference.  
If reason is to play a part in the choice, it is not by demonstrating which 
option overrides the others independent of the chooser’s will, but by 
generating judgment or insight in choosing among the various options, 
perhaps by providing further justifications for whichever choice is 
selected.  Such reasons do not demonstrate that the rejected options 
were wrong: rather the rejected options remain as undefeated, justified 
alternatives to the current decision.69 
Third, the requirement that comparison transforms the options renders 
comparison, not so much illegitimate, as loaded.  Changing the value of 
the various options, or the system of reasoning used to validate them, to 
render them comparable requires justification, and the new way of 
valuing requires explanation and invites comparison with the old.  To 
commensurate incommensurables, in other words, is not to remove the 
decision-maker’s preference, but to express it.70 
Where reasons conflict and are undefeated, justification fails in a 
particular way.  It is not that there is no justification whatsoever for a 
particular outcome, but that there is no reason to prefer one outcome 
over another.  There is no one “right” answer, but multiple right 
answers.  In such circumstances, because there are no reasons that 
clinch the argument either way, the agent may choose among the 
competing options without acting contrary to reason. 
 
C. Raz’s Weak Discretion 
 
Raz acknowledges that strong discretion is a permissible basis for 
decision where undefeated reasons conflict.71 He rejects, however, 
 
68 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 111-18 (1980). 
69 The are available as the source of regret or recrimination if the choice was 
sufficiently moral and consequential. 
70 See JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM 327 (1986). 
71 See Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 312 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
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capricious choice as an option for judges, and instead proposes a theory 
of weak discretion for judicial decision-making..  The question then 
becomes why conflicts of undefeated legal norms permit capricious 
decision for lay decisions-makers, but not for judicial ones. 
 
I shall suggest that Raz’s theory is remarkably similar both to 
Dworkin’s and the Legal Process’ concept of reasoned elaboration as a 
process of principled decision-making, an account that is at the heart of 
the Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.72 Dworkin’s theory depends 
on the claim that there is “one right answer” to every legal problem, 
and latterly, that the one answer that constitutes the “best” 
reconstruction of the law given the judge’s theory of political morality 
in light of the cases “fit” with pre-existing law.73 
Like Dworkin, Raz requires the judge to decide on the basis of a 
decisive, or “best” reason, and that Raz believes that morality and 
doctrinal reasons have a tie-breaking role to play in determining which 
outcome to choose.  In fact, like Dworkin, Raz embraces a theory of 
coherence or fit, albeit a limited one, to determine how to decide when 
morality fails.  It will turn out that both Raz and Dworkin are similar in 
this way to the Legal Process school, including its more conservative 
manifestations.  To develop this argument, I shall first consider Raz on 
weak discretion, or what he calls reasoning according to law. 
 
1. Gaps and Discretion  
 
Raz believes that legal reasoning can be split into two distinct forms: 
(1) reasoning about the law, and (2) reasoning according to law.74 In 
reasoning about the law, legal rules and standards are sufficient to 
determine completely the outcome.  The case is decisively regulated by 
the legal norms, which means that the judge need only apply them to 
generate the outcome.  Where, however, the law runs out, judges are 
required to indulge in something more than technical legal reasoning in 
deciding what to do, “where [in other words] they have … discretion[,] 
they ought to resort to moral reasoning to decide whether to use it and 
how.”75 
72 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 225-75 (1986). 
73 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 230-31 (1986). 
74 “[R]easoning according to law, is — arguably — applying moral considerations.”  
Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
75 See Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1, 10
(1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
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Often, a judge can decide a case without having to consider its moral, 
social, or political merits.  Here the rules of the legal system fully 
govern the outcome. The judge need only indulge in a technical form of 
reasoning that, first, identifies which rules apply to the instant case and, 
second, how these rules apply.76 Here, the court is seen in its 
applicative or declarative role, and its reasoning depends primarily 
upon determining the respective legal strengths of the legal authorities 
independent of the moral, social, or political value of their content.77 
Following Raz, we may call this sort of reasoning “reasoning about the 
law.”78 
Positivists believe that, on occasion, legal rules or standards fail to 
provide a determinate outcome in a particular case.79 For example, 
legal rules or standards may conflict such that no outcome is required 
or completely determined by the law.80 Here there is a legal gap.  The 
judge must either turn to standards “outside” the law or simply pick 
between the various legally justified options. 
 
76 Because a content-independent closure rule determines which legal reason for 
decision prevails, or identifies a legal permission which the judge can use to close a 
legal gap. 
77 It may also include situations in which a global, system-wide closure rule operates, 
e.g., what is not legally prohibited is legally permitted.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 75-77 (1979).
78 See Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1, 10
(1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
79 This failure is a consequence of the a central tenet of legal positivism: the sources 
thesis.  The sources thesis holds that laws are valid by virtue of their pedigree.  A 
reason is a legal reason because it can be derived, by procedures recognized as valid 
by the appropriate legal institutions, from sources that the institutions recognize as 
valid sources of law.  Legal determinacy exists when the sources of law provide a 
clear, mandatory outcome; indeterminacy exists when the outcome required by the 
sources is unclear. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW at 49-50 (“[T]he law on a 
question is settled when legally binding sources provide its [the question's] solution. 
In such cases judges are typically said to apply the law…If a legal question is not 
answered by standards deriving from legal sources then it lacks a legal answer—the 
law on the question is unsettled.”).  Raz’s version of the sources thesis claims that 
sources are the grounds from which legal reasons may be derived, that such reasons 
can conflict, and that where the sources fail to resolve the outcome of such a conflict, 
a gap exists.  Id. at 65. 
80 See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. 
STUD. 457-58 (1988).  Gardner points out that Raz’s definition of a legal gap is 
ambiguous as between cases in which the law requires a particular result and one in 
which the law provides a complete solution to a case.  In the latter instance, the law 
may provide a range of permissible outcomes but, due to incommensurability, fail to 
determine which among them is to prevail.  Whether this latter situation ought to 
count as a gap is discussed, infra at Section IV.   
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Legal gaps arise because legal systems claim to be closed, 
comprehensive systems of norms: they assert the power to settle 
disputes even when their rules do not clearly apply to the situation at 
hand.  In other words, there may be cases in which the norms of the 
legal system purport to guide behavior but fail to apply in a decisive 
manner.  None of the proposed decisions are uniquely required by the 
rules of the legal system: something more is needed.81 How an agent is 
to comply with the law is left indeterminate by the rules of the legal 
system and, if the agent is to be guided by reasons, as opposed to 
whim,82 some further non-legal reason is required to enable the 
application of the legal rules to the given case.83 
There are three potential ways in which to resolve a legal gap.  First, 
extra-legal standards may provide a determinate answer to the legal 
issue.84 Second, where extra-legal standards are also indeterminate, the 
judge might simply decide which she prefers.  Or third, the judge might 
use her “judgment,” without considering extra-legal reasons, to 
determine that one of the competing options should prevail.85 Raz 
endorses the first option, John Gardner the third, whereas I believe that, 
on occasion, the judge may rely on personal preference.  I shall first 
consider Raz’s gap-filling arguments. 
 
2. Raz and the Moral Nature of Extra-Legal Reasoning 
 
Raz’s goal is to demonstrate that courts can be bound to follow non-
legal standards when rendering a decision.   Of course, where the law is 
determinate, the judge should rely upon the available legal reasons to 
settle the outcome of the case.  If, however, there is a gap in the law, 
then the judge must select among a range of legally sanctioned options, 
none of which the judge is uniquely required to apply by the operation 
of some further legal reason.  The legal reasons do not of themselves 
determine which among the reasons ought to win out.  In the absence of 
a decisive reason, Raz contends, there is a legal gap. 
 
81 Although there may be multiple permissible outcomes, all the solutions may be 
legal solutions.  To that extent, the law provides all the options, although it cannot 
distinguish which the judge should prefer.   
82 What Raz calls “taste or inclination.”  See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 339 (1995); Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO 
JURIS 1, 14 (1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
83 We will return to whether this is in fact a legal gap at Section IV. 
84 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7-14 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
85 See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 457-61 (1988); Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: 
A Response To CLS, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 544-48 (1990). 
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The judge may, however, turn to extra-legal reasons to help her 
determine which legal option ought to be preferred on the balance of 
reasons; the extra-legal reasons operate to “break the tie” between the 
competing, undefeated reasons.  This reasoning according to law is 
more limited than fully fledged moral reasoning.  Because the law is an 
exclusionary, institutional system, not just any reason may form the 
basis of a decision.86 So the standard of legal decision does not involve 
considering all the possible reasons (legal and non-legal) which may 
apply to the instant case, but only those extra-legal reasons which can 
help the judge decide between the various legally sanctioned options: in 
more technical terms, those extra-legal reasons which will determine 
which of the undefeated reasons ought to prevail—this is what he 
means by reasoning according to law.87 
Though the scope of reasoning in such circumstances is different from 
fully-fledged moral reasoning,88 nonetheless Raz believes that moral 
reasons help the judge decide which, among a range of legal reasons, 
ought to prevail.  This he characterizes as a moral decision.   That does 
not permit strong discretion: what Hart calls “choice between open 
alternatives.”89 Choice is limited to the valid, but non-decisive 
(undefeated) legal reasons.90 The continued availability of the legal 
reasons as grounds for decision is an important check upon judicial 
discretion, but does not preclude “what Holmes called the ‘sovereign 
prerogative of choice.’”91 
86 Raz, as a positivist, considers that some are excluded from figuring in the decision 
process because law is an exclusionary system of practical reasoning.  See JOSEPH 
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS at 141-46. 
87 JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 330-332 (1995).  
88 The correct standard for legal decision is thus not “all things considered” (some 
reasons are excluded) but rather the balance of reasons. 
89 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d. ed. 1994). 
90 H.L.A. Hart acknowledged, however, that, on occasion, judicial discretion may be 
limited and weak.  Where reasons are undefeated, the conflicting reasons for decision 
do not simply fall away.  These reasons limit the grounds of decision: they still 
operate as reasons justifying decision, but do not provide a “complete” justification 
requiring a unique outcome.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 204-05 (2d. 
ed. 1994); see also H.L.A. Hart, Problems in the Philosophy of Law, in ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 106-07 (1983); H.L.A. Hart, American 
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in 
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 136 (1993).BRIAN 
BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 26-27 (1993). 
91 H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and 
the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
123, 134 (1993). 
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Reasoning according to law depends upon the close relationship 
between law and morality.92 According to Raz, morality (1) speaks to 
the same issues as does the law (I call this the Moral Overlap Thesis);93 
(2) takes precedence in resolving those issues when there is a gap in the 
law (I call this the Moral Supremacy Thesis);94 and (3) may provide a 
closed, decisive set of reasons for decision, at least to the extent that 
they cover the instant case.95 Although the law generally excludes 
straightforward moral reasoning as a ground for judicial decision-
making, that constraint disappears when legal reasons are 
indeterminate. In such circumstances, moral reasons become available 
as a ground for decision.  If the judge is to act both legally and morally, 
she ought to embrace the moral solution.  
 
Turning to morality thus does not mean the judge has the sort of 
unfettered choice characteristic of strong discretion.  First, the range of 
reasons the judge can consider is narrower than fully-fledged moral 
reasoning because framed by the legal issues.96 Whatever decision the 
judge makes will be some form of “specification” of the law in light of 
the available moral reasons.97 Second, those moral reasons are there to 
“break the tie”; they help decide which, among a range of legal reasons, 
ought to prevail.  Reasoning according to law thus requires the judge to 
decide on the basis of reason: where no decisive legal reason is 
available, the strongest moral reason fills the gap.98 
In reasoning according to law, then, although there is a legal discretion 
— the law is ambivalent as between the various possible outcomes — 
there is no moral discretion.  Legal discretion does not entail the sort of 
free-flowing choice embodied in strong discretion.  Rather, judicial 
 
92 Id. at 8. 
93 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 8 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
94 Given the moral impact of the decision, the judge must “produce a body of 
grounds for decisions which can be reasonably believed to be morally better than any 
alternative.” Joseph  Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 8 
(1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).  Thus, 
“reasoning according to law, is — arguably — applying moral considerations.”  
Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
95 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75-76 (1979) 
96 The correct standard for legal decision is thus not 'all things considered' (some 
reasons are excluded) but rather the balance of reasons. 
97 On the process of specification, see JOHN FINNIS NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS 284 (1980); Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A 
Response To CLS, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 544-48 (1990).  They both refer 
to specification as “determinatio.”
98 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7 (1993), 
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
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choice is doubly constrained: only some among the available options 
are legally valid; and morality provides a decisive reason to fix which 
among the available undefeated legal reasons to select.  
 
At this point, it is worth noting that Raz’s “reasoning according to law” 
presents a strong endorsement of the positivist “sources thesis”: legal 
validity depends upon social sources, not merit.99 The positivist 
contention is that the source-based ability to validate norms is what 
differentiates law from morality.100 When reasoning according to law, 
there is a legal gap, not because the judge has any choice or discretion, 
but because the legal system does not provide a complete justification 
of the outcome.   
 
D. Against Preference: Raz on Doctrinal Reasons for Decision 
 
Turning to morality does not always resolve the decision in a 
determinate manner.  Although moral reasons sometimes operate to fill 
the legal gaps, they are not always available in this way.  Problems 
arise if extra-legal reasons for decision are themselves gappy.101 The 
relevant moral reasons may themselves be vague and ambiguous, or 
conflicting and incommensurate.  That is, moral indeterminacy may 
match legal indeterminacy.  When both legal and moral reasons run 
out, there is no way to decide on the basis of a decisive reason, moral or 
otherwise.  The judge would appear to be able to choose as she wishes 
among the available legal options, based on nothing more than 
preference alone.  The judge possesses strong discretion.   
 
Raz distrusts capricious judicial decision-making even when legal 
indeterminacy is matched by moral indeterminacy.  He suggests two 
reasons for not relying on preference: a political reason and a 
coherence-based reason.  The political reason is to assure the public 
that judge is either neutral or following some set of institutional rules, 
so that, even although the judge is deciding according to law but 
without moral guidance, she is nonetheless acting in her institutional 
capacity.102 
99 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199-202 
(2001). 
100 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 203-04 
(2001). 
101 As H.L.A. Hart was among the first to recognize: “Judicial decision, especially on 
matters of high constitutional import, often involves a choice between moral values, 
and not merely the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for it is 
folly to believe that where the meaning of the law is in doubt, morality always has a 
clear answer to offer.”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 204 (2d. ed. 1994). 
102 JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at 339.  The political justification 
targets the transparency of preference to value.  Preferences, according to Raz, make 
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The coherence reason responds to the public’s demand for shared, 
predictable rules of law.  In a modern, municipal legal system, the law 
seeks to govern large numbers of people through shared standards of 
conduct applicable without further direction.103 While capricious 
decisions may be able to guide the behavior of small numbers of people 
in direct contact with the norm-setting authority, they are unable to 
coordinate large numbers of people, particularly in atomistic 
societies.104 Accordingly, some institutional, shared, and predictable 
standard of decision is required.  Capricious decision risks being 
sufficiently random to undermine this feature of law.105 
This applicative model of adjudication, though subject to different 
expressions and assaults, forms the central case of decision “according 
to law.”106 Such a view fits comfortably within most modern liberal 
trends in legal political theory, and receives its strongest modern 
expression in the Legal Process school,107 and Dworkin’s “right 
answer” thesis.108 These envisage the law of modern, liberal legal 
 
sense only if what is valued actually is valuable.  They are thus not reasons in 
themselves, merely endorsements of (independently existing) values or goods.  
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM at 140.  Accordingly, to avoid relying 
upon her legally arbitrary personal taste, preference or inclination — the judge’s 
values rather than the law’s — the judge should base her decision upon doctrinal 
reasons if she is to decide in a manner faithful to her role as a judge.  Raz suggests 
that “it may be unacceptable that [the judge's] private tastes should determine rules 
about duties of disclosure of information in contract formation, or standards of care 
in negligence. If so, we need an artificial system of reasoning which could help 
determine cases where natural reason runs out, thus assuring the public that decisions 
are no mere expression of personal preference on the part of judges.”  JOSEPH RAZ,
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at 339. 
103 See H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW at 125 (1st ed. 1990). 
104 Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 312 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
105 See Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 312 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
106 Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1, 8 (1993). 
107 For a strong legal process rejection of personal preference as an exercise of naked 
power, and an insistence on some principled, neutral tie-breaking reason, see Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
11-16 (1959).  See also Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the 
Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935).  
More conservative versions of Wechsler’s endorsement of neutral principles appear 
in the work of, e.g., Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork.  See Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term — Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 
40 (1961); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
108 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1978); 
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
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systems as a system of general rules or standards applicable to a 
multiplicity of cases in a more-or-less determinate manner.  The source 
and scope of judicial authority to decide cases rests, at bottom, upon the 
principles or values underlying the social order of which the 
government, and in particular the judiciary, is a part. 
 
I shall first consider Raz’s rejection of preference before comparing it 
to the Legal Process and Dworkin’s discussion of adjudication. 
 
1. Raz Against Preference 
 
Raz asserts that two specific types of indeterminacy in particular are 
likely to render law and morality gappy, requiring a turn to doctrinal 
reasons: (1) social and (2) moral pluralism.109 “Social 
pluralism…is…the existence of a plurality of inconsistent views on 
moral, religious, social and political issues in democratic (and in many 
other) societies.”110 Local coherence, the attempt to make sense of 
apparently conflicting doctrine by organizing it under some governing 
value or set of values,111 prevents too much unpredictability or change 
among the governing legal values destabilizing the legal system.  
Where selecting some extra-legal organizing principle threatens too 
radical a change in legal doctrine, the judge should generally resist the 
temptation to engage in a broad-ranging reconstruction of the law 
rather than a local reform of legal doctrine.  Local coherence has 
institutional value, even if the result is morally inferior than broad 
reform.112 
According to Raz, when confronted with social pluralism, local 
coherence requires us to use legal values as way of organizing social 
values.  Within an area of doctrine, the judge must consider the legal 
rule, not in isolation, but as tending to organize or “make sense of” a 
particular aspect of the law.  She should then select that rationalization 
which fits best within the relevant corpus of legal materials, rather than 
 
109 A third situation in which considerations of local coherence have value for 
judicial decision-making exists when some distinct and determinate moral value is 
enshrined as a legal value.  Because the value is itself coherent, judges should apply 
it consistently and coherently when working out its ramifications in the law.  When 
institutionalizing this type of moral value, anything other than local coherence would 
be morally sub-optimal.  Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV.
273, 309-14 (1992), reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
110 Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 311 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
111 Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 311 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
112 Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 309-14 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
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simply expressing her preference for one outcome over another.  Intra-
legal considerations of “fit” and “making sense” thus substitute for 
straightforward moral reasons or judicial caprice.113 
Moral pluralism suggests that moral values may conflict in a manner 
that precludes reducing distinct and competing values to a single scale.  
Where small numbers of people are involved, “there is no moral 
objection to adopting any of the mixes which are not ruled out as 
inferior.  People simply do what they like, choosing in accordance with 
their personal taste.”114 Where, however, larger numbers are affected, 
some relatively coherent scheme of social organization is valuable to 
co-ordinate a given range or type of activity.115 Local coherence 
enables institutions regulate general social behavior by ensuring shared, 
predictable standards of conduct. 
 
Social and moral pluralism suggest that local coherence has particular 
value, then, when the judge is confronted with conflicts between 
incommensurable and so undefeated reasons.  In such circumstances, 
Raz appears to believe that, if the judge cannot be right, she might at 
least be orderly.  Local coherence enables the judge to order decisions 
based upon autonomous and institutional legal values rather than moral 
values or judicial caprice.  Coherence forces her to look backwards at 
the law as it is and at legal doctrine and to use them as the source of 
legal decision.   
 
Raz produces, in effect, a pragmatic and consequentialist argument in 
favor of judicial conservatism.  Faced with the prospect of unsettling 
the public’s established expectations through too sudden and too global 
a change, the judge ought to stop and defer to legal doctrine, even if so 
doing is morally suboptimal.116 
113 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response 
To CLS, 10 OXFORD. J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 544 (1990); John Finnis, On The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement, in: OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 
145, 160-61 (John Eekelaar and John Bell, eds., 1987). 
114 Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 312 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
115 See Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 312 (1992), 
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995). 
116 Raz could be considered to hold a weaker, descriptive position.  This would 
suggest that he is simply stating the practice of a particular legal system when he 
relates that in an effort to avoid pragmatic conflict the courts, forced to choose 
between partial reform inducing pragmatic conflict and a conservative policy, tend to 
favor conservatism and clarity unless the “evils of the existing doctrine . . . [are] 
grave enough to justify . . . partial reform.”  RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW at 201.  This, 
Raz suggests, is the main constraint upon judicial innovation and prevents judge-
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Raz’s concern with the limits of the judicial role in a democratic 
society also provides a point of contact with the Legal Process school.  
He shares their concern that the judge should not attempt too much due 
to lack of information about the potential consequences and lack of 
institutional competence to take responsibility should things not work 
out as planned.  Judges should not, consciously or accidentally, 
destabilize the law where morality is indeterminate. 
 
Two features of the Legal Process movement are relevant here: the 
claim that judges should rely on “neutral principles”117 as a function of 
their adjudicative role; and the use of “reasoned elaboration” to 
determine which principles ought to win out in the absence of a legally 
sanctioned decisive principle.118 
As Brian Bix notes, “‘neutral principles’ was an effort to find constraint 
and legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking, which had been attacked as 
being (inevitably) political and result-oriented.”119 According to 
Herbert Wechsler, neutral principles preclude judicial caprice by 
providing “criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of 
reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will.”120 Rather than 
indulging their personal preferences, judges are required to rely upon 
pre-existing, legislated (and in the context of constitutional 
interpretation, constitutional) values.121 The legislature thus determines 
the relative weight of the different values, rendering them 
commensurable.  The principle technique for applying such values is 
 
made law from reaching the same conclusions, or having the same sweep, as 
legislated law. 
117 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
118 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal 
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994) (discussing development of concept of 
reasoned elaboration). 
119 Brian Bix, Book Review: Positively Positivism (Review of Legal Positivism in 
American Jurisprudence by Anthony J. Sebok), 85 VA. L REV. 889, 898-99 (1999). 
120 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1959). 
121 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1959); see also Jon O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and 
Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 
(1984) (“The neutral principles that we are enjoined to seek are based on values, not 
the full range of values each individual judge might be tempted to enlist from among 
a personal collection of political, economic, or social preferences, but the values that 
can reasonably be asserted to have legitimacy for the adjudication process.”).  See 
also Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at 
October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935). 
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some form of balancing test, which simply declares which of the 
reasons proves decisive in this case.122 
The Legal Process school exemplified H.L.A. Hart’s “Noble Dream” of 
fully determinate adjudication in which the court is constrained to 
operate only in its applicative or adjudicative role.  The striking 
similarity between Raz and Legal Process suggests that Raz participates 
in a positivist version of the “Noble Dream.”  Both are motivated by 
the search for some decisive reason as an alternative to the 
“Nightmare” of private, arbitrary adjudication that they take capricious 
decision to entail.   
 
Perhaps more intriguing is the similarity of aspects of Raz’s theory of 
adjudication to Ronald Dworkin’s.123 Though Raz and Dworkin 
disagree about where the line between legal and extra-legal 
justifications is to be drawn,124 they both agree that decisive moral 
reasons constrain judicial discretion, and that, on occasion, 
considerations of coherence do so too (although they disagree over the 
extent to which the law may be represented as coherent).  Furthermore, 
to the extent that they agree about the form and function of adjudication 
as a predominantly applicative enterprise, they do so for similar 
underlying reasons.  They both believe that neutrality and predictability 
require some sort of public — Dworkin would call it principled125 — 
style of decision-making to respect the democratic nature of the judicial 
process. 
 
122 Bix suggests that “Wechsler's ‘neutral principles’ led to more conservative 
restatements of legal process views by commentators like Alexander Bickel and 
Robert Bork, who combined the post-realist concern about constraining judicial 
action with a deep skepticism generally about morality and specifically about official 
attempts to apply moral principles.”  Brian Bix, Book Review: Positively Positivism 
(Review of Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence by Anthony J. Sebok), 85 
VA. L REV. 889, 898-99 (1999) (citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 
1960 Term — Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961); Robert 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971).  See also Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 599, 642 (1989) (“The hope was that judicially conceived notions of self-
restraint and the duty to render a 'reasoned decision' would establish constraints on 
the freedom of a judge in deciding issues of subjective value.”).  See also Kent 
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
982 (1978). 
123 Perhaps such a similarity should not be surprising, given Dworkin’s indebtedness 
to some of the sensibility, at least, of the legal process school.  See Vincent A. 
Wellman, Ronald Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 
(1987). 
124 BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY at 99-101 (1993). 
125 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
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III. REJECTING RAZ’S RETURN TO DOCTRINALISM 
So far, I have suggested that Raz shares with certain American theories 
of adjudication the belief that a decisive reason can ensure that judicial 
decisions are free from caprice, that is, the personal preference of the 
judge, or what Oliver Wendell Holmes called “the sovereign 
prerogative of choice.”126 For Raz, as for Dworkin and the Legal 
Process school, personal preference undermines the judge’s 
institutional role and militates against predictable, neutral, transparent 
decision-making.  Accordingly, if the judge is to remain within her 
predominantly applicative role127 and simply declare the law, she must 
identify some decisive reason, whether legal, moral, or doctrinal, that 
resolves the case. 
 
Social and moral pluralism place the judge in a predicament.  In either 
circumstance, the available legal and moral values are conflicting and 
incommensurable and cannot provide a decisive reason for decision.128 
The only option, Raz suggests, is to turn back to the law to seek some 
form of determinate outcome.129 Doctrinal or formalist legal values 
provide the only remaining legitimate source of decisive reasons upon 
which to base institutional choice. 
 
Raz’s belief that doctrinal reasons operate to close legal-moral 
indeterminacy appears to conflict with his claim that where the law is 
indeterminate and formalist reasons conflict with moral ones, then 
moral reasons should win out.  Formalism, as a theory of adjudication, 
 
126 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in O.W. HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1920) (cited in H.L.A. Hart, American 
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in 
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 136 (1993)). 
127 I do not deny that Raz recognizes that judges, on occasion, have a legislative role.  
My claim is that he seeks to constrain the legislative role by requiring the judge to 
rely upon decisive moral or doctrinal reasons where legal reasons runs out. 
128 “[T]he return from morality, when asked for its contribution to the issue at hand, 
is that it has no guidance to give.” All we have left is judicial caprice; it seems like 
“the return from morality is that whatever we decide to do becomes the right thing to 
do.” JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 335 (1995).  Where the law is 
concerned, Raz believes, “it may be unacceptable that people when acting as judges 
should simply express their will, their inclination or taste in favoring one solution 
over another.” Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1,
14 (1993). 
129 “Doctrinal reasons, reasons of system, local simplicity and local coherence, 
should always give way to moral considerations when they conflict with them. But 
the[ doctrinal reasons] have a role to play when natural reason runs out.” JOSPEH 
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 335 (1995). That role is to take the place of 
personal preference and to provide an institutional reason for decision when both 
legal and moral reasons are incommensurable.  
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is an attempt to prescribe how judges ought to decide gappy cases: it 
holds that, even although the legal reasons underdetermine the result of 
a case, nonetheless the judge ought not to turn outside the law to extra-
legal reasons.130 Instead, the judge should rely upon some legal 
principle or wait for the legislature to resolve the issue.   
 
Where the relevant rule, taken in isolation, fails to generate a unique 
outcome, the interaction of similar rules in the area of law at issue may 
reveal or generate a doctrinal structure and purpose inherent in that 
body of law.  Relying on such formalistic or doctrinal reasons has the 
advantage of preserving the institutional values of predictability and 
neutrality, and promotes public, institutional, decisive reasons over 
private or extra-legal reasons for decision.  Formalism has costs, of 
course.  It encourages rigidity and insensitivity to particular 
circumstances.  Furthermore, because formalism excludes 
consideration of extra-legal reasons, it leads to morally sub-optimal 
outcomes.131 
Raz rejects formalism as a means of resolving legal indeterminacy 
where morality is determinate, but embraces formalism, or something 
like it, where incommensurable conflicts among legal reasons are 
matched by moral incommensurability.  I shall first examine the 
reasons for rejecting formalism, and then those for re-embracing it in 
the presence of moral indecisiveness, before proposing a three-fold 
critique of that re-embrace. 
 
A. Formalism as a Preference-Excluding Device 
 
Formalist reasons operate in the presence of a legal gap.  They thus 
compet with moral reasons for decision.  But formalism expressly 
rejects relying upon moral reasons to decide a case: the only reasons 
that count are legal reasons.  It thus conflicts with Raz’s belief in the 
prmacy of morality where legal reasons no longer exclude the operation 
of moral reasons.  The point of reasoning according to law is that moral 
 
130 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988).  Schauer 
defines formalism thus: “Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their 'ruleness' 
. . . by . . . screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker 
would otherwise take into account. Moreover, it appears that this screening off takes 
place largely through the force of the language in which rules are written. Thus the 
tasks performed by rules are tasks for which the primary tool is the specific linguistic 
formulation of a rule.”  Id. at 510. 
131 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism 97 YALE L. J. 509, 534-35 (1988); see 
also Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 355 (1973) 
(formalism as view that rule application is mechanical and that mechanical rule 
application is just); ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1-
2 (1986) (formalism as constrained and comparatively applitical decisionmaking). 
JUDICIAL CAPRICE 
30 
reasons can bind judges.  Morality does so by covering the same 
ground as law and providing a more compelling basis for decision, all 
things considered.   
 
In the face of a legal gap, where formalist reasons conflict with moral 
reasons, the prinacy of morality entails the rejection of formalism.  
Reasoning according to law mandates choosing the legally correct 
outcome that comports with the morally correct outcome.132 Unless 
formalist reasons coincidentally comport with moral ones, they will not 
generate the correct outcome.  Legal doctrine is never an appropriate 
basis for filling the gap unless it supports the outcome that is morally 
best on the balance of moral reasons.   
 
Formalism thus does no work where morality is determinate.  If (1) 
there is a legal gap, and (2) the scope of morality and law overlap at 
this point, and (3) morality determines what is the best outcome, on the 
balance of reasons, then where formalist and moral reasons conflict, 
moral reasons defeat formalist reasons.  On the other hand, where 
formalism comports with morality and identifies (by luck or design) a 
moral reason for the outcome, it is redundant.  We would be better off 
(things are simpler, quicker, and more appropriately motivated) 
immediately turning to morality to determine what is morally best. 
 
Raz suggests that formalism does, however, have a role to play in the 
face of capricious decision, and for the same reason that it is redundant 
when decisive moral reasons are available.  Raz’s primary worry is 
personal preference expressed through capricious choices among 
available options.  To avoid basing her decision upon her personal taste 
or inclination, the judge must substitute some decisive reason for 
breaking the deadlock.  Where legal rules and moral reasons both fail to 
generate a determinate outcome, considerations of local coherence and 
consistency may generate a determinate resolution of the case. 
 
The idea that formalist or doctrinal reasons can adjudicate between 
competing outcomes faces three potential objections.  First, doctrinal 
reasons may themselves be gappy, and so, logically, preference may 
come into play even after considering legal rules, morality, and the 
underlying principles and purposes of a legal system (or of law more 
generally).133 
132 JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at 330-335.  
133 It is worth noting that the possibility of capricious discretion is theoretically 
unlimited: whether it is some aberrant feature of legal reasoning or some more 
commonplace occurrence requires empirical investigation.  There is, theoretically, no 
reason to believe that this sort of indeterminacy is limited to the most important 
questions of law or morality.  A case may be “hard,” in the sense of having no 
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Second, Raz may consider that morally excluded institutional reasons 
may return to figure as a basis for decision where morality proves 
indecisive.  Thus, doctrinal reasons that were overridden or excluded 
by moral ones in the face of a legal gap reappear when 
incommensurable conflicts render morality unable to provide a decisive 
reason for decision.  My claim is that the moral reasons do not drop out 
of consideration simply because they are indecisive: these reasons 
continue to operate to override or exclude the doctrinal reasons.  Rather 
than relying on otherwise sub-optimal reasons, the judge should choose 
among the optimal reasons in rendering decision, even if her ultimate 
choice expresses her preference rather than some objective standard of 
decision. 
 
Third, Raz might believe that doctrine has a creative role to play where 
legal and moral reasons are indeterminate.  Rather than “finding” 
doctrine, the judge’s duty is to generate it. The doctrinal imperative 
operates to ensure that the judge justify the outcome using only 
institutional reasons and so avoid non-institutional justifications.  The 
judge’s duty is thus independently to generate some doctrinal resolution 
of the legal and moral conflict without turning outside the law.  She 
must re-interpret the law upon the assumption that some decisive 
doctrinal reason can justify the outcome in the case.  If this is the role 
of doctrine, however, predictability suffers.  There is no decisive 
advance reason for believing one (version of) doctrine will override 
another — or perhaps even what the doctrine will be.   
 
The only remaining justification for endorsing doctrine as a closure 
device would be that it relies upon public and neutral reasons.  If 
preference does so too, then doctrine does not trump preference: in fact, 
I shall show that there are good reasons to believe the opposite is true. 
 
1. The Return of Morally Excluded Doctrinal Reasons  
 
Raz appears to consider that the doctrinal reasons do not simply fall 
away, but come back into consideration after moral reasons prove 
indeterminate.  That is, where morality is indecisive, doctrinal reasons 
fail to be “trumped” by any moral reasons, and so figure in legal 
reasoning all the time.  The legal reasons have not run out: at least 
some of them operate to decide the outcome when moral reasons fail.  
He makes it clear that “[d]octrinal reasons, reasons of system, local 
 
determinate legal, moral, or doctrinal resolution, but nonetheless trivial, altering the 
rights of only the parties, or a few individuals, or settling a relatively unimportant 
question of law. 
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simplicity and local coherence, should always give way to moral 
considerations when they conflict with them. But they have a role to 
play when natural reason runs out.”134 That role is to take the place of 
personal preference and to provide an institutional reason for decision 
when both legal and moral reasons are incommensurable.  
 
How do reasons that could not cure a legal incommensurability before 
we turned to moral reasons do so after we have turned to moral reasons 
and found them insufficient (not, it should be noted, absent)?  Raz 
suggests that there is no conflict in this sort of situation: that doctrinal 
reasons are decisive just because moral indeterminacy renders them 
unopposed, and so there is no reason that could defeat them.135 I
suggest that this view is mistaken.  Just because the moral reasons do 
not provide a decisive reason for decision does not mean that they 
somehow fail to conflict with doctrinal reasons: “running out” does not 
mean “disappear.” Moral reasons are still present, they just fail to 
recommend one, unique option. 
 
Raz’s appears to believe that, where morality is indecisive, the turn to 
morality has sent us down a blind alley and so we must make do with 
the law.  “[T]he return from morality, when asked for its contribution to 
the issue at hand, is that it has no guidance to give.”136 All we have left 
is judicial caprice; it seems like “whatever we decide to do becomes the 
right thing to do.”137 The return from morality is not, however, 
negligible: it is only indecisive.  Moral reasons have overridden or 
excluded legal reasons: the legal reasons do not suddenly become 
morally acceptable just because morality is indecisive.  Morality has 
not exhausted itself in this way. 
 
Doctrinal reasons are not decisive just because other moral reasons are 
indecisive. Undefeated but indecisive moral reasons for decision may 
still be stronger than the doctrinal alternatives. That is, the fact that a 
reason does not outweigh every other reasons is not a barrier to it being 
weightier than some other reasons.  According to reasoning according 
to law, non-excluded moral reasons outweigh doctrinal reasons when 
they conflict. This will not change simply because the moral reasons 
conflict with other moral reasons and are incommensurable with them. 
 
Accordingly, the same argument that justified the turn to morality in 
preference to formalism when legal reasons proved gappy prevents 
 
134 JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at 340. 
135 JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at 339-40. 
136 JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 335 (1995). 
137 JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 335 (1995). 
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returning to formalism when moral reasons fail to produce a decisive 
outcome.  The moral reasons are not cancelled just because they are 
incommensurable and indecisive.  Doctrine provides no new 
information about the relative strength of the reasons: it is not the case 
that their relative strength has changed.   
 
Where moral reasons have attached, although the legal, moral, and 
doctrinal reasons are fragmented, the move from moral reasons to 
doctrinal reasons appears particularly capricious given the Anglo-
American legal system’s tradition of rational justification. In such legal 
systems, it is usual for the judge to give reasons that explain or justify 
her decision. In a situation in which there are no decisive reasons for 
favoring one decision over the other, the judge may have to make her 
decision palatable to the losing side by advancing whatever 
justificatory reasons she can. These may indeed be technical, doctrinal 
reasons. But the use of such reasons may be the means by which the 
judge signals to the parties that there was no decisive reason which 
determined the outcome: case was a close one, some decision had to be 
made, and in the end she judged that this would be the better outcome.   
 
Once the judge has started to consider moral reasons, then simply to 
argue that these reasons no longer apply and that technical legal 
considerations ought to decide the issue appears to be an evasion of the 
issues.138 Deciding on the basis of technical reasons may itself be 
considered a partial and prejudiced manner of deciding the issue, 
especially as such considerations are innately conservative, favoring the 
status quo.  Where, however, the court’s primary institutional role is 
applicative and justified by the values of predictability and neutrality, 
courts should avoid engaging in unwarranted and controversial 
legislation, instead favoring the status quo. 
 
2. Incommensurable Conflicts Among Doctrinal Reasons 
 
The most straightforward objection to Raz’s reliance on doctrinal 
reasons is to suggest that they may be conflicting and incommensurable 
rather than cohesive and mutually supporting.  It turns out that many 
theorists tend to organize areas of law around conflicting, rather than 
unitary, doctrines, and I begin by giving a few examples.  If doctrinal 
reasons, along with the more directly applicable legal and moral 
reasons, are as fragmented as is often claimed, then judicial caprice 
 
138 Perhaps because the parties have alerted the judge to the moral arguments, 
perhaps because morality is unavoidable, given the circumstances.  See e.g., ROBERT 
M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) 
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must operate to resolve the outcome.  This is so even though all the 
possible outcomes are legally valid outcomes.   
 
Doctrinal reasons may be incommensurable.  That is to say, different 
systems of reasoning used to organize areas of law into coherent 
chunks may overlap and compete to explain the more particular rules or 
standards.  For example, the basic concepts of contract law are 
notoriously contradictory, some favoring communitarian values that 
“channel[] and regulat[e]…market transactions according to ideals of 
social justice,” others embodying market values of laissez faire by 
providing “a facility for individuals to pursue their voluntary 
choices.”139 Each theory purports to explain the manner in which the 
law of contract is organized, and consequently the attitude of the 
legislature and courts towards the point and purpose of contractual 
arrangements.  The two models propose to account for the values that 
do or should underlie the law of contract.  They offer a means by which 
to gauge and critique different procedural and substantive 
arrangements, but which conflict at different points and in different 
ways, often providing incommensurable reasons for decision 
 
The type of doctrinal conflict — between commensurables or 
incommensurables — impacts the structure of a particular area of law.  
Where the doctrines conflict in a commensurable manner, once a legal 
source (a case, statute or custom) determines the relative strength of 
one doctrine vis-à-vis the other, a judge can and should use that source 
to identify the outcome of future conflicts.  The case, statute or custom 
authoritatively determines how subsequent cases are to be decided.140 
To the extent that the doctrines are incommensurable, doctrinal 
conflicts are “nested.”141 That is to say, conflicts between the 
communitarian and laissez faire models constantly re-appear, unsettled, 
in conflicts among rules or principles that embody each value (or 
embody both at the same time).  The outcome is not predetermined by 
prior resolutions of the conflict but must be reconsidered anew on each 
occasion the conflict arises.  
 
American jurisprudence has, at significant periods, considered doctrinal 
reasons to exist in a more-or-less regimented state of nested conflict.  
For example, Karl Llewellyn suggested that legal doctrine existed in 
conflicting canonical statements, such that each doctrinal argument 
 
139 Hugh COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1 (1986). 
140 This is a central feature of Hart’s description of core and penumbra.  See H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119 (2nd ed. 1994). (discussing “duality of a core of 
certainty and a penumbra of doubt”). 
141 Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics Of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75
(1991). 
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could be opposed with a conflicting one.142 Duncan Kennedy 
developed Llewellyn’s argument by suggesting that there are a range of 
stereotyped doctrinal “argument bytes” that it is the business of the 
lawyer to know and deploy.  Each byte is matched by an opposite, and 
both are nested, recurring throughout the law in various situations, so 
that on each occasion the conflict must be resolved anew.143 A final 
familiar version of this thesis is Roberto Unger’s suggestion that the 
law is structured by various principles and counter-principles, such that 
the judge must choose between them whenever deciding a case.144 
It is not necessary to embrace Legal Realism or Critical Legal Studies 
to recognize that doctrine may be indederminate.  Consider, as an 
example of an conflict among doctrinal reasons, Morrison v. Thoelke 
145 a case of first impression concerning formation of contract.  The 
problem addressed by the court in Morrison is that, under the general 
rules of contract formation, an offer may be revoked at any time before 
its acceptance is communicated to the offeror, but not after 
acceptance.146 Communication may, however, be a temporally 
extended process, and where there is a lapse of time between the 
sending of a revocation and its receipt, the offeree may accept the offer.  
That is in fact what happened in Morrison.
Using the mails, Morrison sent Thoelke an offer for the sale of 
property; the latter on receipt of the offer sent his acceptance of the 
contract back through the mail to Morrison. After mailing the 
acceptance, but prior to Morrison's receipt thereof, Thoelke attempted 
to withdraw his acceptance of the offer. The question is whether the 
acceptance had legal effect once it had been deposited in the post or 
only upon receipt.  The judge was faced with a clear conflict between 
two legally-supported choices, neither of which was decisive.  
 
In Morrison, there are two conflicting rules, each of which provides 
persuasive legal authority for the alternative choices.  The “deposited 
acceptance” rule stipulates that depositing the letter in the post signifies 
acceptance; another rule conceives of the post as the agent of the 
sender, and delays acceptance until it is received by the offeror.  
 
142 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons about how Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950) 
(describing a series of canons and counter-canons that are interrelated as a series of 
doctrinal thrusts and parries). 
143 Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics Of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75
(1991). 
144 ROBERTO M. UNGER, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983). 
145 155 So. 2d 889 (1963). 
146 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1586. 
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Whichever rule is selected will fill  a gap in the revocation-of-contract 
rule, in which the term “communicated to the offeror” is vague.  There 
is no decisive legal answer, because this is a case of first impression 
and other courts are split on the issue, as is the relevant academic 
literature.  There is also no moral answer.  Obligation, whether legal or 
moral, has not attached yet.  Here legal and moral obligations cover the 
same ground.   
 
More to my point, doctrine itself is indeterminate.  The Morrison court 
noted that there is a persuasive academic literature surrounding the 
various justifications for the different versions of the postal rule.147 
Unfortunately for the judge, the academy failed to provide an 
overriding reason for selecting one among the various doctrinal 
justifications.  The various doctrinal reasons remained undefeated 
without any reason, moral, legal, or doctrinal, to break the tie. 
 
Here balancing fails because the competing legal (and other) reasons 
are of equal strength or incommensurable.  No reason is decisive and 
the judge must exercise a choice.  Balancing, however, is only one half 
of the Legal Process prescription for neutral adjudication.  The other 
half consists in what Legal Process scholars call the “reasoned 
elaboration of purposive law.”148 Reasoned elaboration operates where 
commensurability fails and balancing is impossible.  It requires the 
outcome to be justified by a neutral, public, participative process that 
engages in, on the one hand, a technical explanation of the judge’s 
institutional competence and, on the other, an exploration of the 
purposes of the substantive rule or doctrine at issue, “consistent with 
the other established applications of it and . . . in the way which best 
serves the principles and policies it expresses.”149 
The process of elaboration cannot remain neutral if the judge’s personal 
preference becomes the tipping point when comparing competing 
options.  The whole point of reasoned elaboration is that the relevant 
reasons transcend the immediate result.  They are to be contrasted with 
the personal political or social preferences of the judge.  Accordingly, 
the tie-breaking reason must derive from some neutral source, not from 
willfulness or personal preference.  
147 Morrison at 155 So.2d at 904. 
148 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2042 (1994). 
149 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2043 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Purpose serves the function of neutrality in two distinct ways.  First, it 
operates as a substantive criterion of any law, requiring the judge to 
determine the goals it was enacted to serve given the other valid rules 
and standards.  In this way, purpose can operate as a form of 
hypothetical testing,150 to exclude non-conforming outcomes and 
remove indeterminacy over the rule’s application.  Second, it operates 
as a procedural criterion, such that certain styles of reasoning are 
appropriate given the different roles and competencies of diverse 
institutions within the law.151 
In Morrison, however, after elaborating the doctrines, neither is 
weightier than the other.  The process of hypothetical testing has 
excluded an insufficient range of options, and the judge must still pick 
among them.  In this case, the moral and legal issues await the judge’s 
choice, rather than direct it.  Reasoned elaboration takes the judge only 
so far: she must still choose without some decisive reason for so doing.  
For future cases, what is required is certainty: thus, all that is required 
is a decision.152 Whichever reason the judge chooses will do, but she 
must choose one.153 Her choice is not, however, determined by the 
chosen doctrine, but endorses it. 
 
3. The Duty to Generate Decisive Doctrinal Reasons 
 
A final version of formalism may hold that where legal reasons prove 
indecisive, and the available doctrinal organization of the rules does not 
determine the outcome, then the judge should generate another version 
of the doctrine, one that does resolve the issue at hand.  The judge’s 
duty is thus to expand or innovate doctrine in an attempt to settle the 
case based upon the adjudicative imperative to decide.  Here, the point 
of reasoned elaboration is not to find and declare the legally mandated 
outcome, but to create it.154 So long as the judge provides some neutral 
 
150 See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 630, 667 (1958). 
151 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2043-45 (1994). 
152 See Morrison, 155 So. 2d at 904. 
153 This seems to be the way things appeared to the court.  The judge first justified his 
decision first on the need to decide the case one way or the other. “We can choose 
either rule; but we must choose one. We can put the risk on either party; but we must 
not leave it in doubt.”  Morrison, 155 So.2d at 903. The court next considered that its 
decision would be “in accord with the… essential concepts of contract law.”  
Morrison at 155 So.2d at 904.  This is a doctrinal reason for action. 
154 See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 143-52 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
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principles for the rational exposition of the law, judicial legislation may 
be sufficiently determinate as to be neutral and predictable.155 
Dworkin pointedly rejects incommensurability as having a role in 
adjudication.156 Rather, Dworkin argues that a set of coherent legal 
principles exists to settle the outcome in each case.157 For Dworkin, as 
for the legal process school, the judge’s goal is to link the instant case 
to the more general principles organizing the legal materials, and to use 
these to generate a determinate or at least “neutral” processes by which 
to resolve legal indeterminacy.   
 
Neil MacCormick , like Joseph Raz, provides a positivist account of 
judicial decision-making as that embraces incommensurability.  
MacCormick attempts to accommodate the sort of “reasoned 
elaboration” characteristic of the Legal Process school and the 
principled decision-making propounded by Dworkin.  MacCormick 
adopts two of the requirements of reasoned elaboration: (1) that an 
outcome be “formally just,”158 which is to say, generalizable from a 
particular ruling to a more general rule or principle; and (2) that the 
rule or principle identified is a legal rule or principle, or can be derived 
from legal rules or principles.  He too suggests that, where the law 
proves indeterminate, the job of the judge is to harmonize the operative 
rules with the general principles of the legal system.159 Where the 
principles fail resolve the case, necessitating a choice on 
consequentialist grounds, “evaluation should be made by reference to 
legally appropriate values. . . [and] must be shown to be coherent with 
the rest of the legal system or the relevant branch of it.”160 
MacCormick is not, however, methodologically committed to 
commensurability.  He believes that it is perfectly possible, however, 
that coherence simply will feature “weakly” or not at all in the 
 
Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994) 
(discussing development of concept of reasoned elaboration). 
155 See See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); Vincent A. 
Wellman, Ronald Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 
(1987); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 11-17 (1959) (propounding importance of neutral principles for 
constitutional adjudication). 
156 See Ronald Dworkin, On Gaps in the Law, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW'S
ONTOLOGY, 89, 90 (Paul Amselek and Neil MacCormick, eds, 1991) (best political 
theory for resolving hard cases is one that rejects incommensurability). 
157 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 225-75 (1986). 
158 See NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 81, 86 (1994). 
159 See Neil MacCormick,“Principles” Of Law, JURIDICAL REV. 217, 222 (1974). 
160 See NEIL MACCORMICK, H. L. A. HART 126 (1981). 
JUDICIAL CAPRICE 
39 
justification of a particular outcome.161 There may be more than one 
legally valid rationalization of the rules, so that multiple proposed rules 
are perfectly coherent with legal doctrine.  A choice must somehow be 
made between them.  That choice may be made on the basis of 
consistency with prior extensions of the law or on consequentialist 
grounds. 
 
Consequentialist arguments are a means of testing possible rules by 
considering how they “make sense” of both the law and the real world, 
and limited to those supported by legal principle.162 On the one hand, 
the judge must evaluate which rationalization fits best (rather than 
merely fits) with the corpus of valid legal materials.163 On the other 
hand, as with the process of reasoned elaboration, the judge tests the 
impact of the rule by considering its effects in the world.  The purpose 
of testing is to determine which form of the proposed rule is most likely 
to achieve the ends contemplated by the controlling principle.164 
MacCormick thus avoids John Finnis’s critique of Dworkin’s 
coherence-based theory of “law as integrity.”165 Finnis suggests that 
the two values Dworkin adduces a comprising law as integrity, “fit” 
and “justifiability,” are incommensurable with each other, and so no 
judge can engage in the sort of balancing that Dworkin proposes would 
produce a unique “best” or decisive outcome.166 MacCormick does not 
seek a unique outcome: he instead proposes that judges should evaluate 
the consequences of the various proposed rules.  All possible outcomes 
are legally justified, because based on some rule coherent with the 
existing legal principles.  Each outcome has a different impact on the 
world.  MacCormick’s point is that it is worth evaluating what that 
impact is, and determining whether it is consistent with prior rulings in 
that area.167 If, at the end of this process, there are multiple such 
 
161 “[C]onsiderations of 'coherence' may be considered only weakly justifying 
considerations. . . .coherence concerns the derivability of a novel decision or ruling 
in law from the re-existing body of law, not the ultimate defensibility of the decision 
or ruling from a moral point of view.”  Neil MacCormick, Coherence In Legal 
Justification, in THEORIE DER NORMEN: FESTGABE FÜR OTA WEINBERGER ZUM 65. 
GEBURTSTAG , 47 (Werner Krawietz  et al., eds., 1984). 
162 See NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 101-2 (1994). 
163 See NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 101-3 (1994). 
164 NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 150 (1994).  
165 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 225-75 (1986). 
166 See John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire, 6 L. & PHIL. 357, 
370-76 (1987). 
167 Compare JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 363 ((1986) (“where an 
agent is faced with only two options and they are incommensurable … [o]ne cannot 
compare the value of the options, one can only judge their value each on its own.”). 
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justified outcomes, the judge must pick among them.  Capricious 
choice remains a possibility.  
 
Where incommensurability exists, so does the possibility of capricious 
choice.  Accordingly, to the extent doctrinal arguments are 
incommensurable they fail to insulate decision from caprice.  The judge 
will have, at certain points, the power to decide capriciously.  In certain 
situations, I now argue, she will have a legal right to do so. 
 
IV. PERMISSIONS 
So far, I have suggested that there is a distinction between decisively 
regulated cases, where the law resolves the conflict among reasons to 
provide a uniquely required outcome, and completely-but-indecisively 
regulated cases, where there are multiple legally acceptable outcomes, 
but no single outcome is required.168 Here the scope of the legal 
decision may be limited to selecting among the available outcomes.  At 
a minimum, the distinction between decisively and indecisively 
regulated cases indicates the possibility that the only basis for judicial 
decision is judicial caprice.   Where there is thoroughgoing 
incommensurability, that is, where legal incommensurability is 
matched by both moral and doctrinal incommensurability, there is no 
decisive reason to dictate the outcome.  The judge must exercise her 
personal choice to select one among the legally valid alternatives. 
 
In this section, I demonstrate that the legal power to choose 
capriciously is matched by the legal right to do so.  That right is 
generated by an implied legal permission just to pick one of the 
competing options — an implication that arises from the undefeated 
nature of the competing reasons.  When reasons are undefeated they are 
converted into what I call pragmatic permissions.  To show how, I shall 
consider some comments by John Gardner and Raz on structure of 
conflicts among reasons. 
 
A. Express and Implied Permissions 
 
Permissions confer the right to act, not only the ability to do so.169 An 
ability is a power to change an individual’s normative status;170 
168 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979) (where . . . two [conflicting 
reasons] are equally balanced [t]hey cancel each other and it is false that there is a 
conclusive reason for the act and false that there is a conclusive reason for its 
omission.”). 
169 “Permissions indicate the absence of constraints. To state that one is permitted to 
act in a certain way is to say that one will not be acting contrary to [a] reason in 
doing so.” JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 89 (1990). 
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however, the power to change an individual’s normative status need not 
entail the right to do so.  For example, the doctrine of double jeopardy 
confers a power upon a criminal jury: to disregard the law and reject 
conviction.171 It is generally conceded, however, that the jury has no 
right to nullify — no law permits nullification — and so no right to be 
informed of its power.172 Hence one source of discomfort with jury 
nullification: the jury appears to disregard its oath to follow the law and 
illegitimately invade the authority rightfully exercised by the judge, 
legislature, and prosecutor. 
 
Permissions, on the other hand, indicate a legally-conferred right to act 
in a particular manner.  Permissions may be “express” (or “explicit”173)
or implied.  Express permissions are exclusionary, precluding the 
operation of reasons that conflict with the permitted action, as well as 
providing a permission to act or not, as the agent so chooses.174 The 
agent is not required to perform the act stipulated, but rather may (or 
may not) perform it.  So if, for example, the rules of a particular golf 
course stipulate that: “If a player's golf ball lies on a path on the course, 
then the player is permitted to drop the ball within one club's length of 
the path,” there is then an express permission to move the ball if it lies 
on the path.  The player may equally well elect not to move the ball, 
instead playing it from where it lies, and still conform to the rules of the 
course. 
 
Express permissions depend upon a source stating that such a 
permission exists.  Such permissions are not to be inferred from the 
absence of reasons for action (the absence of constraint), nor are they 
tied to any reason for action.175 Express reasons thus only exist in 
source-based systems of reasoning. 
 
170 JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 215 (1990). 
171 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (“Perhaps the 
most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that 
‘[a] verdict of acquittal... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without 
putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’” 
(alterations and omission in original) (quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 
671 (1896). 
172 Compare People v. Dillon, 668 P. 2d 697, 726 n. 39 (Cal. 1983) (right to be 
informed of power to nullify would lead to anarchy); with United States v. Datcher, 
830 F. Supp. 411, 415-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (power to nullify of constitutional 
magnitude, though jury has no right to be informed of power). 
173 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 90 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 65 (1979). 
174 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 89-91 (1990). 
175 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 89-91 (1990). 
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Implied permissions exist when there are no reasons imposing practical 
constraints upon action, that is, when there are undefeated reasons to 
the contrary.  Raz calls these “weak” or “conclusive” permissions,176 
and they exist in the absence of a clear reason for action—in law, a 
clear or determinate source.  They are “conclusive” (I prefer 
“decisive”) because they form the conclusion of an argument over what 
sorts of reasons there are for doing a particular act.  Where there are no 
reasons that clinch the argument either way then there is a permission.  
Raz considers that there is an implied permission where reasons of 
equal strength conflict.177 Each cancels the other, transforming the 
conflict from one regulated by reasons into one in which neither of the 
conflicting reasons operate — a position that, it turns out, is only partly 
correct.  
 
It is worth considering in some detail the nature of implied permissions.  
Because Raz believes that the conflicting reasons or equal strength 
cancel each other out, he believes that these reasons disappear.178 In 
such circumstances, the scope of an implied permission is constrained 
only by the other norms of the system.  The judge can rely on any non-
excluded reason to decide the outcome — what John Finnis would call 
“‘open-ended’ practical reasoning,”179 and what Hart would call an 
open choice.  I believe that, where reasons or equal strength or reasons 
incommensurable as to strength conflict, they are not canceled in this 
way.  They remain to operate as undefeated grounds for decision, and 
the scope of the permission is limited to choosing among the 
conflicting undefeated reasons. 
 
1. Conflicts, Gaps, Permissions 
 
Raz’s discussion of implied permissions depends upon the concept of 
“canceling.”180 Canceling is familiar to lawyers.  The classic example 
is frustration of contract, and the classic case on frustration is Krell v. 
Henry.181 Krell resulted from the postponement of Edward VII’s 
Coronation due to the King’s appendicitis.  Henry had paid Krell a 
deposit to hire an apartment overlooking the route of the coronation 
procession; after the procession was cancelled Henry refused to pay the 
balance.  Krell sued.  The Court of Appeals sided with Henry, asserting 
 
176 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 89 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 64 (1979). 
177 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
178 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
179 John Finnis, On the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 38 
(1985). 
180 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS at 27. 
181 [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.), aff'g in part 18 T.L.R. 823 (K.B. 1902). 
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that there was no breach of contract because the contract was frustrated 
by “the non-existence” of the foundation of the contract, namely the 
procession.182 
As the frustration analogy makes apparent, canceling conditions do not 
outweigh the other reasons for choice, nor do they exclude one reason 
for decision.  They are simply facts that makes a reason disappear from 
our calculus over what to do.183 
Raz considers that when reasons of equal strength conflict, the 
conflicting reasons cancel each other out; they not only block each 
other’s operation but disappear as reasons for action.184 There are no 
longer any reasons requiring a particular decision, only an implied 
permission.  The judge’s discretion is not limited to choice between the 
competing reasons when deciding what to do.  It is not only the 
conflicting outcomes that are permitted: the scope of the legal 
permission is larger than that, because the conflicting reasons are 
cancelled — gone — and no longer operate to constrain choice.  In the 
absence of regulation, anything not precluded by law is permitted.185 
I propose a modification of Raz’s account of conflicts of reasons of 
equal strength.  To see why, consider the game of basketball.  In 
basketball, a reason for calling a foul on a player is that there is a 
source — one of the “Rules of Basketball” produced by the National 
Basketball Association, basketball’s governing body186 — for the 
basketballing reason-statement that if a player holds or otherwise 
impedes the progress of an opponent using her hand or forearm, then 
the player has fouled the opponent.187 The source for calling the foul is 
the governing body’s authoritative statement of the rules of basketball.  
The rule operates as a reason requiring the official to call a foul 
whenever she observes one. 
 
Now, by the rules of basketball, only one personal foul can be called on 
a given play.  Nonetheless, on any given play, multiple players could 
 
182 [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 747 (C.A.). 
183 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27 (1990). 
184 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 89 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 64 (1979). 
185 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 85-89 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
186 See Official Rules of the National Basketball Association at 
http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_index.html (last checked August 30, 2006). 
187 See NBA Rule 12: Fouls and Penalties at 
http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_12.html?nav=ArticleList (last checked August 
30, 2006). 
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hold or impede their opponent.  Whichever happens first blocks (Raz 
would say “cancels”) the later fouls from operating as a reason for 
assessing a foul.188 But what happens if both events occur 
simultaneously, that is, if two players foul an opponent at the same 
time.  There are two equally strong reasons that conflict, one for 
assessing a foul on Player 1, and another for assessing a foul on Player 
2. Who is to be called for the foul?  
 
There is no reason that mandates the choice of one player over the 
other.  Either decision is permitted; neither is uniquely required.  The 
rules are indeterminate as to what is to be done, and they permit the 
referee to make a choice between the conflicting options.  In other 
words, she has a discretion.   
 
The referee’s discretion is, however, constrained to the available 
options.  It is not the case that the reason for calling the foul is 
frustrated.  The reasons for calling the foul — Players 1 and 2 each 
fouled their opponent — do not disappear but are transformed from 
decisive to undefeated reasons for decision.  That is, the fact that Player 
1 fouled the opponent does not override the competing reason for 
calling the foul on Player 2, but is not overridden in its turn, and vice 
versa. 
 
Furthermore, the scope of the permission is limited to the competing 
reasons.  There are a range of other non-excluded reason she could 
point to:189 that yet another person, Player 3, fouled the opponent; or 
that, in the absence of a reason for calling a foul she could just let play 
continue.190 Because the reasons do not disappear, however, she is 
limited to relying on the fact that each player fouled the opponent, but 
has no decisive reason for picking a particular player.  She ought just to 
“judge” between the two options in order to render her decision.  But 
how?  She is beyond judgment here: judgment was what established the 
parity of the conflicting reasons for calling simultaneous fouls.191 All 
 
188 This is a somewhat simplified version of the rules, see See NBA Rule 12: Fouls 
and Penalties at http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_12.html?nav=ArticleList (last 
checked August 30, 2006), but it will do for present purposes. 
189 Excluded reasons include moral or social reasons to decide who gets the foul, 
such as one of the players is a noted philanthropist, or comes from a disadvantaged 
background.  Furthermore, they include some gamer-related reasons, such as one 
player has had a better game and should be awarded accordingly 
190 In basketball, it sometimes appears that there is a customary rule that fouls are not 
calls on the last few plays of a game, especially in the playoffs.  That rule has not 
been expressly endorsed by the National Basketball Association. 
191 A further point: decision here is does not match Dworkin’s second category of 
weak discretion, i.e,., that the decision is simply unreviewable.  The laws of cricket 
provide that this type of decision may be reviewed by a third umpire on television.  
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she can do is pick one or other of the players.  Her choice of player will 
be capricious, and permissibly so. 
 
B. Conflicts Among Reasons of Equal Strength 
 
As we have seen, Raz believes that where conflicting reasons of equal 
strength conflict, there is a permission.  John Gardner’s view is more 
difficult to discern: he states that there is an express permission to 
decide among incommensurable sources in certain circumstances; but 
the circumstances he cites concern commensurable sources.  By 
elaborating upon his examples, I shall suggest that: (1) there is an 
implied permission where undefeated reasons, whether 
incommensurable or equal-and-commensurable in strength, conflict; (2) 
that the existence of such permissions depends upon a modified version 
of Raz’s account of conflicts among reasons of equal strength; and (3) 
that the resulting permission is limited and “pragmatic” — the 
underlying reasons do not disappear, but remain to limit the ensuing 
range of options. 
 
1. Permissive Sources 
 
Gardner’s discussion of legal permissions considers the phenomenon of 
permissive sources of law.  A permissive source exists where there is a 
conflict between intra-jurisdictional and extra-jurisdictional sources, 
such that the court may rely upon either type of source.192 The 
conflicting sources may be either commensurable, because they are of 
comparable law-generating authority, or incommensurable, such that 
comparison between the two presents significant problems.193 
To suggest that sources are incommensurable is to suggest that two or 
more socially identifiable entities make incompatible claims to 
authority upon our practical deliberations.  Gardner believes he has 
identified the following example in the English legal system.194 The 
English Court of Appeal is usually bound by its own previous 
decisions.  However, where such a decision conflicts with a decision of 
 
However, because the reasons for given each batsman out are in equipoise, review 
will not remove discretion 
192 John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
457, 457-60 (1988). 
193 Permissive sources may also be express or implied.  An express permission exists 
where the jurisdiction has enacted a norm allowing the court to rely upon either type 
of source.  An implied permission exists where two commensurable and equally 
authoritative sources conflict. 
194 John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
457, 459-60 (1988). 
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the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal may follow a Privy Council 
decision.  Here there are multiple sources for decision (the different 
courts, with their ability to generate binding legal norms) and on 
occasion those sources may conflict over what counts as the correct 
reason for decision (they establish different precedents).  Gardner treats 
such sources as incomparable.”195 
Gardner’s assertion that these sources — the Court of Appeals as 
compared to the Privy Council — are incommensurable seems, without 
more, odd on its face.196 Incommensurability consists in the inability to 
weigh and rank the competing options.197 To commensurate the 
options would transform the nature of the source to be commensurated.  
But there is no evidence that the Court of Appeals regards its own 
precedent-setting authority and that of the Privy counsel in this way.198 
Instead, these sources are not differently (incommensurably) 
authoritative, but rather of equal authority. 
 
Consider another example of expressly permissive sources, this time 
from the American legal system: the doctrine of intra-court comity, “a 
rule that generally dictates that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should 
follow brethren judges' rulings on identical issues.”199 The doctrine 
applies at the federal trial-court level, such that a district court judge 
may consider the decisions of her trial-court colleagues in a particular 
district or circuit, but is not bound by them.200 This type of permission 
appears identical to the sort contemplated by Gardner, and represents a 
conflict between sources that the doctrine of intra-court comity 
identifies as equally authoritative and commensurable. 
 
195 John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
457, 459 (1988).  While Gardner, following Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of 
Value, reprinted in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979), calls such conflicts 
“incomparable,” I prefer the more accurate term “incommensurable.” 
196 I happen to think that Gardner is wrong here.  His mistake is a result of Raz's 
argument that there is no legal gap where permissions conflict.   RAZ, AL at 75-76.  
Gardner wishes to argue that there is a gap, and so he assumes that the sources are 
simply incommensurable, rather than of equal strength. 
197 “A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true that one is better than the other 
nor true that they are of equal value.”  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 
322 (1986).  This statement concerns incommensurability as to value, but could 
easily be reformulated to provide a definition of incommensurability as to strength. 
198 See Worcester Works Finance Ltd. v. Cooden Eng. Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 Q.B. 210, 
217. 
199 American Silicon Technologies v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed Cir. 
2001). 
200 Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Construction Co., Ltd., 240 F.3d 
956, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) (“While the decisions of their fellow judges are persuasive, 
they are not binding authority.”). 
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2. Implied Permissive Sources 
 
According to Gardner, the type of gap generated by a permissive source 
derives from an express permission.  I suggest in instead that the sort of 
discretion Gardner contemplates can result from an implied permission.  
Furthermore, it does not matter whether the conflicting legal reasons 
are equal in strength or incommensurable: so long as they are 
undefeated the judge possesses a permission to pick among them to 
resolve the case. 
 
Judges may have an implied permission to consider a range of sources 
of law based on the existence of an implied permission.  The United 
States federal court system is a two-tier system of geographically 
divided inferior federal courts in which each federal circuit court of 
appeals equally authoritative as any other.  Each circuit court is able to 
create binding precedent only in its own jurisdiction; such precedent 
does not bind the courts of sister circuits.201 
In any given circuit, where there is no applicable precedent, each of the 
other federal courts of appeal constitutes an equally authoritative source 
of law.  Where the sister court precedents conflict, choice among them 
depends upon an implied permission: each source is of equal strength, 
and none overrules the other.  Accordingly, each federal court of 
appeals has an implied permission to use its sister-courts’ precedents 
where its own precedents fail to determine the outcome of a case and 
the sister courts’ precedents conflict. 
 
If a court in the First Circuit lack an authoritative intra-circuit 
precedent, it could, of course, turn to morality as easily as turning to 
sister circuit precedents.  Nonetheless, the major difference between the 
other circuits’ precedents and moral considerations is that extra-circuit 
precedents identify the solutions that have been reached in comparable 
jurisdictions.  A persuasive source thus provides a concrete example of 
hypothetical testing, sharing the same sort of subject matter and 
standards of reasoning as the First Circuit, and showing the 
consequences for legal doctrine in a similar legal regime and 
consequences for the same general society.  The court may then 
compare such consequences to the hypothetical impact of other, non-
legal reasons on the balance of reasons.   
 
Extra-circuit sources provide a judge with a legal way to resolve a gap 
in the law.  They are often adverted to by courts, especially when faced 
 
201 See Judicial Code of 1948, Chapter 3; see also Supreme Court Rule 10 (reason for 
granting certiorari is splits among circuit courts.) 
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with cases of first impression featuring issues that have been addressed 
in other jurisdictions.  Recognizing that conflicts among equal-and-
commensurable reasons generate permissions demonstrates how such 
permissions operate as a to avoid potential indeterminacies.  Where 
there is an express permission to resolve intra-jurisdiction 
indeterminacy by considering equally authoritative sources, that 
permission enables the judge to evaluate what is going on around her 
and to rely upon her fellow judges’ decisions.  There may also be an 
express permission to consider extra-jurisdictional sources, as when the 
English Court of Appeals may consider the European Convention on 
Human Rights in certain circumstances.202 
Furthermore, there may be an implied permission to choose among 
conflicting, equally strong extra-jurisdictional sources.  Such a 
permission permits uniformity or comity in the substantive law of 
related or abutting (but nonetheless distinct) jurisdictions. The court 
can avoid conflict with those jurisdictions or, where there is conflict, 
consider which has the best set of arguments on the merits.  There is no 
need to turn to open-ended practical reasoning.203 
3. Nesting 
 
So far, in considering both express and implied permissions, I have 
considered conflicts between equally authoritative sources of law.  
Conflicts between sources equal in strength manifest none of the 
fragmentation of value that Gardner is concerned about.  Because the 
conflicting reasons are commensurable, the outcome is “on the same 
plane” whichever reason is preferred.  Here there is no change in the 
mode of evaluation after a decision rendered.  The scope of the 
permission is limited to relying on one or other of the legal sources as a 
ground of decision.  This would appear to comport with Gardner’s 
description of weak discretion, picking one or other reason without 
considering further moral, political, or pragmatic justifications.204 
There are, however, some features of the conflict between the Court of 
Appeal and Privy Counsel that do appear to mimic conflicts between 
incommensurable reasons.  In particular, the resolution of any one 
 
202 See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 458 (1988). 
203 See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 458 (1988). 
204 See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 458 (1988). 
JUDICIAL CAPRICE 
49 
conflict does not establish that one source is more authoritative than the 
other for future conflicts: the conflict remains “nested.”205 
Nesting generally describes the ability of reasons to retain their strength 
even though defeated in particular circumstances.  Thus, although in 
one situation reason A may have defeated reason B, if the conflict 
between those reasons is nested, the relative strength of the reasons 
must be re-decided whenever that conflict arises again.   Thus, where 
conflict is nested, a particular resolution in one part of the system may 
always be reviewed and changed when it re-appears in another part of 
the system. 
 
Parity between the sources, however, explains the reason why: choice 
between the sources fails to establish a hierarchy for subsequent cases.  
Establishing such a hierarchy would remove discretion because the 
superior source would defeat the inferior.  Maintaining the sources in 
equipoise without resolving their conflict retains the discretion to use 
one or other source.  Thus, despite the availability of the Privy 
Counsel’s decisions, in a case of first impression, to fill a gap or, where 
its decision conflicts with a pre-existing precedent of the Court of 
Appeal, change the law, we learn nothing new about the system’s 
structure, because the competing sources continue to operate as 
available alternatives.   
 
Resolving the conflict among permissive sources does render more 
determinate the substantive law.  Once the outcome is settled, then the 
doctrinal issue is determined for the future because the Court of 
Appeals has chosen which rule to follow in these circumstances.  The 
Court has not, however, settled which is the more authoritative source.  
The sources remain in equipoise should their precedents diverge on 
other issues.   
 
Such an option is important for the English legal system as a pressure 
valve, permitting the Court of Appeals to reconsider its past decisions.  
The case is regulated if it conforms to past precedent, but precedent is 
defeasible dependant upon the available permissive sources.206 
205 “‘[N]esting’ [is] . . . the reproduction of the of particular argumentative 
oppositions within the doctrinal structures that apparently resolve them.” Duncan 
Kennedy, A Semiotics Of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 112 (1991); see 
also id. at 112-116; J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990) 
(book review). 
206 See Richard H.S. Tur, Defeasibilism, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 355, 359 (2001) 
(defeasibility entails that “the defeating consideration impacts only upon the result 
but not on the rule.  Th[e] . . . rule . . . remains intact and available to be applied 
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Gardner’s example of permissive sources thus depends upon the 
presence of a source — the Court of Appeal, which has the power to 
bind itself — generating the express permission to consider the Privy 
Counsel as an alternative source of precedent.  This device enables the 
Court of Appeal to change tack without having to overrule itself or 
await overruling from a higher court.  The rule of intra-court comity 
also functions as an express permission, allowing a judge to conform 
her decisions to those of her colleagues.  
 
This, incidentally, is at odds with one way of interpreting H.L.A. Hart’s 
account of the consequences of judicial decision in penumbral cases.  
Hart suggests that:  
 
When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront the issues 
at stake and can then settle the question by choosing between 
the competing interests in the way which best satisfies us.  In 
doing so we shall have rendered more determinate our initial 
aim, and shall incidentally have settled a question as to the 
meaning, for the purposes of this rule, of a general word.207 
Here, Hart appears to indicate that the core is essentially expanding, 
reaching out to provide determinate guidance because the court’s 
decision resolves the legislative indeterminacy.  Of course, legislation 
may introduce new indeterminacies, and this is as true for judicial as 
for Congressional or Parliamentary legislation.  Where, however, courts 
confront some indeterminacy, however, Hart suggests that their 
decision resolves it.   
 
One interesting outcome of my analysis is to suggest that conflicts 
among permissive sources equal as to strength results not only from 
some indeterminacy, but preserves that indeterminacy — at least with 
regard to the strength of the conflicting reasons — for future cases.  
The conflict remains “penumbral” and particular legal decisions fail to 
settle the issue in so far as the “core” is concerned.208 
again and again even though trumped or defeated by equitable conditions in a 
particular case.”).
207 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph 
Raz, eds., 1994) 
208 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-29 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & 
Joseph Raz, eds., 1994); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 124-27 (1981) 
(discussing Hart’s theory of core and penumbra).  See also BRIAN BIX, LAW,
LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 18 (1993) (same). 
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C. Pragmatic Permissions? 
 
Raz considers that, where reasons of equal strength conflict, both 
reasons disappear because they are mutually canceling.209 In that case 
there is a permission to rely on any reason because there is no reason to 
limit the range of permissible reasons for decision.  Raz further claims 
that incommensurable reasons do not conflict in this way.  They do not 
cancel each other and so, logically, do not entail the existence of an 
implied permission.210 I suggest a modification of this theory based on 
the basketball analogy. 
 
If there is a permission where reasons conflict, it is not due to the 
absence of any constraint, but due to the undefeated nature of the 
conflicting reasons. So far, the discussion has been limited to conflicts 
among commensurable reasons of equal strength.  But if, as I claim, the 
distinctive feature of an implied legal permission depends upon the 
undefeated nature of the competing reasons, then undefeated-ness, 
rather than equality, is the key to implied permissions where reasons 
conflict. 
 
Conflicts between undefeated reasons, whether equal in strength or 
incommensurable, need not logically imply a permission; rather, they 
are perhaps better understood as generating what I shall call a 
pragmatic permission.  Of the conflicting options, none is weightier 
than the other, and there is no external reason that can break the tie.  
The reasons are thus undefeated and blocked from operating as a 
decisive reason.  They each operate as a permissible basis for decision 
and the judge must choose among them.  Furthermore, choice does not 
definitively settle the relative strength of the conflicting reasons for the 
legal system: the issue of their relative strength is nested so that the 
outcome of the conflict remains unresolved for future cases in different 
circumstances. 
 
The concept of pragmatic permissions, unlike that of logically implied 
permissions, does not distinguish between commensurable and 
incommensurable reasons.  Both types of reasons generate undefeated 
conflicts: incommensurable reasons are undefeated by definition; 
commensurable reasons where they are equal in strength.  What matters 
is the absence of a decisive reason combined with the need to decide.  
If this is correct, conflicts among incommensurable reasons result in a 
pragmatic permission: to pick among the reasons without having to 
 
209 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
210 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979). 
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adduce a tie-breaking reason.  The judge may simply prefer one reason 
to the other. 
 
Pragmatic permissions are not limited to conflicts among sources.  
Where there is a pragmatic conflict among the available legal reasons, 
courts cannot always wait upon the legislature to settle the issue, but 
generally must decide as which party is to prevail.  That decision 
cannot always rest upon some decisive legal, moral, or doctrinal reason.  
In such circumstances, there is a legally implied pragmatic permission 
to pick among the conflicting reasons.  Whatever result is selected will 
be legally justified.  The “real” basis for picking among the reasons — 
the judicial hunch, what the judge had for breakfast, or political 
preference — need not be.  To that extent, the judge’s choice is 
capricious, and expresses strong discretion.   
 
1. Scope of Capricious Decision 
 
How prevalent is capricious decision depends upon how widespread is 
incommensurability.  There are a number of different points of view on 
this front, and space only to sketch them out rather than attempt a 
resolution.   
 
Incommensurability skeptics211 such as Ronald Dworkin deny 
incommensurability exists and propose a two-step argument to prove it: 
first, it is always possible to compare options (comparability is always 
an option); so second, the decision to compare or not to compare 
expresses one’s social or political commitments rather than some fact 
about the structure of value.212 If they are correct then capricious 
decision is never an option. 
 
Incommensurability, then, cannot just be assumed or asserted just 
because a decision-maker cannot find (or imagine) a reason that 
demonstrates that one option is better than the various alternatives.  The 
absence of comparability does not entail the presence of 
 
211 For a discussion of such skepticism, see JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON 50-54 
(1999). 
212 Dworkin, for example, points out that the various features of incommensurability — 
intransitivity, undefeatedness, and change in value — may be explained, individually or 
in conjunction, by other features of practical reasoning.  Exclusion, for example, explains 
how reasons may be both intransitive and incomparable.  Other explanations for the 
inability to compare reasons may include the operation of a canceling condition, which 
knocks one or more competing options out of consideration; the requirement that reasons 
operate in a particular order; or that competing values may be vague or open-textured.  
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, On Gaps in the Law, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW'S
ONTOLOGY, 89, 90 (Paul Amselek and Neil MacCormick, eds, 1991).   
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incommensurability.  To demonstrate the existence of 
incommensurability, Dworkin claims, requires the production of some 
formal or objective mark that explains why the different values cannot 
be compared.213 
There are a variety of possible rejoinders to Dworkin.  One set of 
responses suggests that there is some objective “scheme of value” 
which “stands behind” and “marks out” the set of commensurable 
values from the set of incommensurable ones and determines which 
reasons are commensurable or incommensurable with which.  Such a 
“scheme of value” is supposed to provide a source for 
incommensurability.   
 
The simplest scheme of value is one in which all values are, by their 
very nature, incommensurable.  This is implausible as a universal thesis 
about the nature of values because some discrete values can be 
compared without loss or transformation.  A more sophisticated version 
suggests that values are logically grouped into different categories, the 
formal features of which render the categories incommensurable inter 
se, although the values in each category are commensurable intra se.214 
Yet another version suggests that there are certain basic goods or values 
that must, as a logical precondition of practical reasoning, be 
incommensurable.215 
A different thesis is that our decision to consider values 
commensurable or not expresses the way in which we value.  No 
objective scheme of value exists to assure the accuracy of our decision 
to commensurate or not.  One version of this theory suggests that such 
expression may take a more or less standard “social form,” with some 
room for experimentation.216 Another version suggests that our 
expressions of comparative value are more or less reasonable 
dependant upon contextual features.   
 
213 Another theorist who demands such a mark is Richard Epstein.  See Richard A 
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, Or Is Utility the Rule of the World?, 1995 
UTAH L. REV. 683 (1995). 
214 Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL 
QUESTIONS 128 (1979). 
215 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 115 (1980).  See also 
JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, 87-88 (1983); John Finnis, 
Commensuration and Public Reason in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 215, 215 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997); Matthew Adler, Law 
and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998). 
216 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 344-58 (1986). 
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Finally, it is worth noting that incommensurability may be more or less 
worrisome, dependant upon its source and nature.  For the most part, 
we do not worry about inconsequential incommensurabilities: so long 
as judicial choice among apples and oranges has no significant social 
consequences there is no great issue in permitting the judge to pick 
among the alternatives.  Problems arise, however, where choice is of 
constitutional magnitude and the stakes are high.  I shall conclude by 
considering one high-stakes example of incommensurability: what 
would happen if sources were in fact incommensurable in the manner 
Gardner suggests, and what legal means the judge has to choose among 
them. 
 
D. Conflicts Among Incommensurable Permissive Sources of Law 
 
Consider the following modification of Gardner’s argument that there 
may be incommensurable sources of law; but these would appear to be 
most likely to arise where there is some choice between two 
sovereigns, such that comparing them would differently represent or 
alter the nature of the authority exercised by one or both of the 
sovereigns.  One famous example of this phenomenon can be found in 
Sophocles' Antigone.217 Polynices lost a quarrel with his brother, 
Eteocles, over which of them would succeed their father, Oedipus, to 
the throne of Thebes.  Thus thwarted, Polynices raised an army to seize 
the throne by force.  Both brothers died in the ensuing battle.  The play 
begins with news that Creon, the new king of Thebes, has decreed that 
Polynices should be disgraced by remaining unburied, in direct 
contravention of religious custom.  Polynices' sister, Antigone, thus 
faces a choice between conflicting incommensurable institutional 
sources: the law of Thebes or the law of the Gods.  
 
The problem is not whether each institution — in broad terms, the state 
and the church — is authoritative for her: they both clearly are so.  
Antigone’s problem is to determine how she is to accommodate and 
give weight to the claims made upon her by each institution; how and 
what weight as a source of reasons for action each ought to have.218 To 
compare the different sources in terms of its rival, or some third 
institutional system, would be to transform them.  Accordingly, the 
 
217 Sophocles, Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at colonus, 
(1988). 
218 Antigone’s tragedy is thus to exist when the underlying sources of social 
obligation are becoming secularized, so that the commands of the Gods are replaced 
by considerations of justice.  Justice Moore’s claim, infra, that the courts should pay 
more attention to the religious bases of American law, is perhaps an attempt to 
reverse this process. 
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sources are incommensurable.  That does not appear to be the situation 
presented by the Court of Appeal in Gardner’s example. 
 
There may be incommensurable sources in American law.  For 
example, the recent controversy surrounding the use of international 
sources to interpret various terms of the American Constitution may be 
understood as debate over the belief that non-American law provides a 
permissive source for interpreting the constitution.  Those who resist 
the use of foreign sources may be understood to suggest that comparing 
the sources transforms, at least, the American legal system.  It is not 
that the other legal systems are better or worse, they are just 
significantly different.219 
Another example, and one that perhaps provides a more modern 
version of Antigone’s problem, is the American controversy over the 
separation of church and state.220 As currently framed, one of the 
claims made by religionists is that secularists fail properly to respect 
religious values embodied in the structure of American law.221 Where 
liberal secularists behave “as if agnosticism about the theistic 
foundations of the universe were common ground among believers and 
non-believers alike,”222 religion provides not only a separate 
epistemology but one that is properly understood as incommensurable, 
“really an alien way of knowing the world — alien, at least, in a 
political and legal culture in which reason supposedly rules.”223 
The religionist’s claim, that secular and religious traditions present 
different sources of authority (epistemological and practical) and 
distinct standards of reasoning, presents a difficulty for adjudication.  
In a society that recognizes multiple religions, or multiple versions of 
the same religion, or that religion and un-religion may properly co-
exist, the problem becomes one of maintaining neutrality between 
incommensurable religious traditions.  To understand the issues 
 
219 This may, of course, be the Gardner’s claim.  If so, he has not expressly made it.  
See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 459-60 (1988); compare Worcester Works Finance Ltd. v. Cooden Eng. 
Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 Q.B. 210.  From an institutional point of view, moreover, 
Gardner’s choice of authorities are clearly comparable among the hierarchy of courts. 
220 Particularly the Establishment Clause jurisprudence codified in the Lemon test.  
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
221 See, e.g., Glassroth v Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (presenting 
religionist’s disagreement with Supreme Court over moral status of Ten 
Commandments). 
222 Michael McConnell, God is Dead and We Have Killed Him: Freedom of Religion 
in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 163, 174 (1993) 
223 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 142 (1993). 
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presented in terms of one tradition (and use it as a basis for decision) is 
exactly to endorse that tradition.224 Choosing precisely transforms the 
source and style of epistemological and practical authority to that of the 
chosen religion.225 
A particularly strong version of the religionists claim is presented in 
Glassroth v. Moore,226 a case in which Roy Moore, the then-Chief 
Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, placed a 5280-pound granite 
monument in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building.227 
Moore’s purpose was “to remind all Alabama citizens of, among other 
things, his belief in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over 
both the state and the church.”228 
Is Justice Moore asserting that the Ten Commandments, precisely 
because it is a repository of Judeo-Christian morality,229 is a permissive 
source of legal values?230 Imagine that, contrary to current 
interpretations of American law, Moore is correct that the Decalogue is 
a permissive source.  There would then be an incommensurable conflict 
 
224 To the extent that the adjudicator remains neutral among religions, and seeks 
some rational (as opposed to faith based) means of deciding among them, she 
remains in the secular, alien realm. 
225 That may be the very goal of some religionists (so long as the chosen religion is 
theirs).  Appiah, for example, suggests that such a choice is a high-stakes gamble: 
“The ultimate result of such epistemic forbearance [adopting the religionists 
viewpoint and alternative epistemology], however, goes beyond protecting the 
sectarian from unwelcome interference; the ultimate result is to erase the legal 
distinction between spiritual and temporal considerations,” KWAME ANTHONY 
APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 87 (2005) — a result which positively invites 
secular interference.   
Another means of making the link between Antigone and the modern Establishment 
Clause debate is to consider an interpretation of the play suggesting that Antigone 
goes out of her way to deny the city’s law and so herself creates the conflict between 
the two sources.  Perhaps that is one way of understanding one religionist demand 
that its epistemology be properly acknowledged in the secular sphere. 
226 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). 
227 Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285. 
228 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). Moore‘s campaign for the Alabama 
Supreme Court depicted him as “the ‘Ten Commandments Judge” . . . .  The central 
platform of his campaign was a promise ‘to restore the moral foundation of law.’”  
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285.  Furthermore, when dedicating the monument, “He 
explained that the location of the monument was ‘fitting and proper’ because: “this 
monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and judges of the circuit and 
district courts of this state, of the truth stated in the preamble of the Alabama 
Constitution, that in order to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and 
guidance of Almighty God.’”  Id. 
229 In other words, for Moore it is the Decalogue’s source, as a command from God, 
rather than its content, that establishes it as a permissive source of law. 
230 He may mean to suggest that the Decalogue is a mandatory source that trumps all 
other sources of law. 
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between the Establishment Clause, purporting to preclude the 
government from preferring a particular (or any) religion, and the 
Decalogue as a founding text of a particular religion or set of religions.  
Here, the nature and sources of American government are at stake.  
That appears to be precisely how Roy Moore sees things.   
 
Nonetheless, the problematic legal status of the Decalogue brings to the 
fore the core tenet of legal positivism: some sources of practical 
authority are not legal sources.  Legal sources are the relevant law-
creating institutions of a particular legal system.  Because the law is an 
exclusionary system, courts are entitled to rely upon the rules created 
by legal sources and ignore those created by non-legal sources.  
Exclusion provides an alternative to incommensurability as grounds for 
rejecting the Decalogue.  Accordingly, from the point of view of the 
United States Constitution, as currently interpreted, religion is not only 
an incommensurable, but also an excluded source of legal norms.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have suggested that a judge has both a legal power and a legal 
permission to simply pick an outcome from among multiple available 
options where legal incommensurability is matched by moral and 
doctrinal incommensurability.  Accordingly, the Noble Dream of will-
less decision, which holds that the judge’s personal preference never 
operates — or should never operate — to determine the result of a case, 
is unattainable in legal systems where some of the reasons are 
incommensurable.  Capricious decision is a necessary feature of such 
systems.  How widespread a feature depends upon the amount of 
incommensurability in the various legal reasons for decision. 
 
Furthermore, the absence of a decisive reason does not entail that there 
is a gap in the law.  We thus should not assume that it is only in 
unregulated cases, where there is a legal gap, that the judge is able to 
utilize her discretion.  An implied pragmatic permission arises where 
commensurable reasons of equal strength or incommensurable reasons 
conflict.  The court has the power and the duty to apply the norms of 
the legal system, but in the system is ambivalent as to which of two 
conflicting norms the court should choose.  The legal system thus 
grants the court a permission to choose which of the conflicting reasons 
it wishes to apply.  There is no gap because whichever norm the court 
chooses to apply has a legal source.  The case is regulated.  This 
suggests that there is not always an easy correlation with the presence 
of a discretion for the court, and the presence of a gap in the law.  
There may be no gap, but still a discretion.  This point complements 
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Raz’s belief that, when reasoning according to law, that there may be 
no discretion in the presence of a gap. 
 
